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This work is an exemplar for effective conversions of manned craft into unmanned 
surface vehicles (USVs) utilizing Open Systems Architecture (OSA). This study provides 
a sufficient basis to initiate an in-depth examination and business case analysis of OSA 
asset repurposing by a forum such as the Defense Acquisition Research Symposium 
(DARS) or major Defense acquisition organization.  The knowledge contained in this 
study alone may be sufficient justification to proceed with further analysis since the 
knowledge of how to effectively convert manned systems into unmanned systems is an 
enabler for rapid force reconstitution.   
This thesis shows that OSA technical architecture is best implemented by defining 
high-level flexibility requirements. Not only does this leave more trade space for the 
designers and engineers, but it also helps keep system costs low by loosely defining the 
interfaces. Furthermore, it also allows the system to be upgraded at a later time. With 
these advantages considered, this thesis argues that proper up front architecting can 
balance non-recurring acquisition costs with future recurring lifecycle and modernization 
costs. 
In the case of the landing craft utility unmanned surface vehicle (LCU USV), this 
analysis makes the case for extending the useful service life of a Naval asset via 
repurposing it, instead of traditionally disposing of the asset. Oftentimes, to satisfy a 
requirement in traditional DOD acquisition programs, acquisition authorities choose the 
lowest cost, most technically acceptable choice from amongst feasible, new design 
alternatives. Strategic reuse or repurposing of assets represents an innovative alternative 
to the traditional sense of new-product acquisition, new-construction, and product 
modernization decisions. OSA capabilities make such innovative reuse possible. 
The LCU USV may be used for a plethora of missions if redesigned for OSA and 
flexibility. Although this thesis focuses mostly on the simple addition of unmanned 
navigation and maneuvering capability, a few simple architectural modifications can 
greatly increase the utility of this craft. Although the exact mission for the LCU USV in 
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the future remains undefined, implementing OSA throughout this end-of life (EOL) 
process ensures that accommodating potential missions is as cost effective as possible.  
OSA has both business and technical aspects that must be addressed concurrently 
throughout the systems engineering process. In order to achieve maximum openness from 
a system, the right business and technical questions must be asked and those questions 
must be appropriately answered. While it is true that there is no single, guaranteed 
formula for successful systems engineering, there are a few questions that must be 
addressed when considering how to effectively repurpose and reuse existing assets. All 
questions must allow stakeholders to evaluate the program with respect to whether or not 
the program has achieved maximum openness. The answers to these questions are based 
on principles found in Better Buying Power (BBP), the DOD OSA Contract Guidebook, 
modular open systems architecture principles, as well as other heuristic notions. OSA 
principles may be used to provide the best chance of long-term program success, low 
program costs, low risk, and technically acceptable program performance.  
At a fundamental level, the following overarching questions must be answered 
appropriately in order to satisfy the principles of open systems architecture when 
executing the traditional systems engineering (SE) methodology. All other questions 
follow from these simple, general questions. 
 Can one or more qualified third parties add, modify, replace, remove, or 
provide support for a component of the system, based on open standards 
and published interfaces (DOD 2013)? 
 Are qualified new entrants to the market for the task able to compete for 
the work immediately, and in every year moving forward (Musk 2014)? 
These questions build the framework for executing OSA throughout an SE 
program. The OSA framework includes a set of principles, processes, and best practices 
that provide more opportunities for competition and innovation. This framework helps to 
field systems that are affordable, interoperable, minimize total ownership cost, optimize 
total system performance, are easily developed and upgradeable, and achieve component 
software reuse (DOD 2011).  
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In the case of system repurposing and reuse, it must be beneficial to the system 
owner to continue system operation instead of system disposal. In order to accept the 
feasibility of fielding the LCU USV, the US Navy must decide that it is worth the return 
on investment (ROI). There are several decisions that go into making this a reality. 
Implementation of OSA is essential to the future effectiveness and cost of these 
decisions. These decisions include the decisions not to dispose of the LCU although the 
craft are well beyond the intended service life. The decision must be made to maintain the 
current hulls in an operational state. A subsequent decision must be made to install 
equipment alterations that convert the LCU hull into a USV. Finally, operating an LCU 
as a USV likely requires the decision to add additional payload operations so that 
payloads can be operated remotely or autonomously.  
This thesis demonstrates the process by which the concepts of OSA might be 
applied within the context of an existing, traditional SE methodology to result in the 
production of a flexible system that supports the Defense enterprise in maintaining a 
competitive advantage. This demonstration is accomplished by combining an existing 
systems engineering process model with the use of OSA management and business 
principles to execute a successful asset-repurposing program. Specifically, this work 
examines conversion of a manned asset into an unmanned system.   
OSA facilitates interoperability between systems by effectively leveraging 
“common capability descriptions in system requirements; common, open data models, 
standards, interfaces, and architectures in system design, and common components in 
system acquisition strategies” (DOD 2011). Because the traditional approach to systems 
engineering must be considered as a contributing factor to the high cost, high complexity, 
and highly integrated systems that exist today, this thesis contends that traditional SE 
methodologies must be combined with OSA principles in order to realize systems that are 
open, flexible, and more affordable.  
A reference model and open standards are used to show the value of interface 
flexibility. This study also shows that, when working with open systems, the systems 
engineering team can avoid major system changes, even if the system is already 
rigidly/maturely designed, by developing an open technical architecture within existing 
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design constraints. By defining key interfaces, modules, stations, and zones, the impact of 
alterations are anticipated to be less costly. This type of design methodology is especially 
effective for highly technical systems such as the LCU USV where technology advances 
may occur rapidly. 
With respect to Naval and ship systems, more granularity may be added to the 
definition of open systems architecture in order to specifically address the maritime 
domain. OSA in U.S. Naval ship design is more fully described as “modularity and 
flexibility in open systems” (Marcantonio 2007). OSA principles have important 
implications for naval architects, and provide the basis for the first step of the flexible 
design process: identifying the sources of uncertainty. Flexibility is only valuable if it 
addresses an underlying uncertainty appropriately (Page 2011). The interchangeable 
architecture of system elements, modules, sea-frame zones, stations, and associated 
interfaces in an open system is what makes such architecture affordable and flexible. 
To demonstrate utility of this OSA approach to systems engineering management, 
this thesis demonstrates an atypical asset-repurposing program. The Landing Craft Utility 
(LCU) was not intentionally or originally designed as a highly reusable platform (i.e., 
“truck”) with an inherent ability to be repurposed for future, yet-to-be-determined 
missions. However, this thesis demonstrates that there is value in design for reusability 
and repurposing of exiting assets as exemplified by the conversion of a manned LCU to 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
This thesis explores the use of open systems architecture (OSA) as a tool for 
effective management of asset repurposing. It details the use of Open Systems 
Architecture (OSA) to convert a manned asset, the Naval Landing Craft Utility (LCU) 
1610 class vessel, into an unmanned asset, an unmanned surface vehicle (USV).  
The United States (U.S.) has been challenged in recent times, and is likely to be 
challenged in the foreseeable future, with the uncertainty of asymmetric threats, 
nontraditional military operations, and unprecedented calls to support its friends and 
allies in times of conflict and hardship. Maintaining the United States’ military and 
diplomatic competitive advantage requires continued superiority in military operations. 
More importantly, beyond current national Defense objectives, the U.S. military must 
ultimately be prepared for operational requirements that cannot yet be predicted.  
In preparing for threats, yet to be determined, the United States cannot have total 
certainty regarding what types of assets will be needed, and where they will be needed to 
meet these challenges. Furthermore, the United States cannot guarantee that the funding, 
manpower, or other resources will be available to meet each emergent military 
requirement.  
One way to adjust immediately to these uncertainties is to leverage flexibility that 
currently exists. One of the most flexible assets in the U.S. military today is the landing 
craft. These craft have unrealized potential to serve the military in a wide variety of 
missions. Unmanned systems are another type of potentially flexible asset with the 
capability to reduce risk to personnel, take on new mission sets, and augment traditional 
objectives. Combining the flexible architecture and operation of existing landing craft 
platforms with the added capability and benefits of unmanned technology has the 




A major challenge for defining the future of military capabilities is to address new 
methods, tools, and skills needed in the early design efforts and systems engineering (SE) 
giving programs greater cost performance in maintaining the competitive advantage.  
One of the greatest challenges in defining the platforms that can execute the 
uncertain missions of the future is establishing the processes, tools, and principles that are 
used today, in early system development, possibly for many years (or even generations,) 
before the system is designated for a particular mission. Because of this, strategic 
program planning, systems engineering and systems architecture strategies must be 
considered far in advance of making final design and business decisions. Early 
consideration of such strategies ensures a wide array of affordable, flexible, open, and 
competitive future capability options.  
One method of developing these strategies is to define the technical rigor of 
building systems in a way that supports the Chief of Naval Operations’ (CNO) vision of a 
future employment model, “Payloads Over Platforms.” This open, and relatively 
unrefined, method for developing systems is especially challenging because the Navy has 
limited experience in building systems this way. Adequately preparing the acquisition 
workforce to utilize this method requires better definition of the Government’s roles and 
processes prior to industry involvement.  
In the July 2012 issue of Proceedings magazine, the Chief of Naval Operations 
(CNO) Jonathan Greenert asserted: 
Navy platforms, particularly ships and aircraft, are large capital 
investments frequently designed to last for 20 to 50 years. To ensure our 
Navy stays relevant, these platforms have to adapt to the changing fiscal, 
security, and technological conditions they will encounter over their long 
service lives. It is unaffordable, however, to adapt a platform by replacing 
either it or its integral systems each time a new mission or need arises. We 
will instead need to change the modular weapon, sensor, and unmanned 
vehicle “payloads” a platform carries or employs. In addition to being 
more affordable, this decoupling of payload development from platform 
development will take advantage of a set of emerging trends in precision 
weapons, stealth, ship and aircraft construction, economics, and warfare. 
(Greenert 2012) 
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In many ways this is uncharted territory for Naval acquisitions. In some respects, 
this is the “Wild West” of Naval acquisition in that there is a tremendous amount of 
reward to be reaped from smart intellectual investments made now. By reducing, 
preparing for, and accommodating the uncertainty surrounding acquiring new 
technologies, the Navy can find ways to buy more capability with less money. In his 
memorandum on Better Buying Power (BBP), the Undersecretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD AT&L) stated, “the goal [is to] deliver 
better value to the taxpayer and warfighter by improving the way the Department does 
business” (Kendall 2012).  
In 2013, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, 
Test and Evaluation (DASN RDT&E) testified before congress outlining the ways that 
Department of Navy (DON) acquisition leadership continues to promote the adoption of 
BBP and Open Systems Architecture (OSA) to support innovation, reduce the time 
needed to integrate improved technologies (cycle time), lower systems’ total ownership 
costs, and emphasize reuse via modularity (Lacey 2013).  
More recently, in 2014, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research 
Development and Acquisition and the Commander of Naval Sea Systems Command 
testified before congress regarding several procurement, modernization, and sustainment 
initiatives to aimed to affordably and effectively enable the warfighters to operate as a 
more flexible force (Stackley, Mulloy, and Hillardes 2014). 
Many of the Navy initiatives seem to focus on the high-value, high-visibility 
assets (i.e., ships, airplanes, submarines), and rightfully so, but there may be significant 
value in looking for potential existing flexibility in the subordinate supporting systems, 
infrastructure systems, cyber systems, and in other areas of the Navy fleet. The U.S. 
Navy, in recent times, has used highly valuable assets for missions on the lower range of 
military operations. One area that is uncultivated by current initiatives is opportunities for 
large-scale repurposing through technology insertion into existing assets. If the Navy can 
use repurposed, lower cost, or lower value assets for these missions, it is then able to 
provide potential cost savings and free up high-value resources for more critical missions.  
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Traditional, industrial-age Naval acquisitions practices produced systems that 
were highly specified and integrated. The Navy continues to operate with the products 
and assets of these practices. The Navy is likely to continue with these products and 
assets for the near future until the knowledge of flexibility, OSA, and BBP principles can 
become part of the tacit operational knowledge, and best practices of the acquisition 
community. In the meantime, there are existing systems that inherently contain a high 
level of flexibility. The Navy needs to find and exploit opportunities for flexibility now.  
C. OPERATIONAL CLIMATE 
In order to further establish the background, an understanding of the operational 
climate is necessary. In this section, four (4) major elements of the operational climate 
are detailed including a discussion of their benefits and challenges.  
1. Littoral and Coastal Operations 
Littoral and coastal operations represent the current presence of asymmetric and 
untraditional military operations. With the impending retirement of the Oliver Hazard 
Perry-class frigates (FFG-7), the Osprey-class costal mine hunter, Cyclone-class patrol 
coastal ship (PC) and the Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship, the U.S. Navy has 
an increasing need and an evolving strategy for new operational capabilities in the 
littorals. To meet this need, the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) was introduced into the Navy 
fleet. The Undersecretary of Defense describes the LCS as a “smaller, less capable, and 
less expensive [ship] than an FFG, but larger, more capable, and more expensive than 
Patrol Coastal Ships (PCs) and Mine Countermeasure Ships (MCMs)” (Work 2013). He 
goes on to compare LCS to PC and MCM craft saying that “PCs and mine warfare 
ships—all to be ultimately replaced by LCSs—were single-purpose ships with useful 
littoral counter-anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities but very slow transit speeds” 
(Work 2013). 
Although LCS is planned to take over the mission set of several smaller, slower 
ships, that does not negate the potential value that still exists in these smaller vessels. The 
Naval landing craft, with its broad range of possible missions, has potential overlaps in 
CONOPS with the LCS. Advances in amphibious assault vehicles, and a potentially 
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repurposed landing craft can offer a reliable, rugged follow-on support to LCS missions. 
Having more options in the littoral and coastal regions can allow for better operational 
flexibility.  
2. Riverine Operations 
With an increasing amount of inland and guerilla warfare, riverine operations are 
likely to become increasingly important. A 1990 Naval Special Warfare Command 
(NAVSPWARCOM) study recommended that the U.S. Marine Corps develop a joint 
riverine capability using only existing assets. Four (4) LCU 1610 Class craft were 
amongst the list of U.S. Naval assets in the final capability (quoted in CNA 2006).  
Landing craft were last used in major U.S. Navy riverine operations during the 
Vietnam War. Lessons-learned and strategies from the Vietnam War are relevant to 
current U.S. Naval challenges. There were many commonalities between the Vietnam 
missions and today’s Naval challenges. These commonalities include a varying array of 
missions, an international riverine advisory and cooperation effort, joint operations, use 
of U.S. in-house design capability, and the ability to “reach back” to Vietnam riverine-
force veterans for expertise (CNA 2006).  
During the Vietnam Conflict Era, landing craft were used to keep supply routes 
open and penetrate small waterways (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1.  Vietnam war era landing craft conducting inland waterway  
operations (from NHHC 2014). 
 6
In the late 1960s, the U.S. Navy employed a 23-ft craft, similarly configured to an 
LCU, to operate as a remotely controlled “chain drag” minesweeper (see Figure 2) (U.S. 
Department of the Navy [DON] 2007). Since that time, the U.S. Navy has participated in 
several similar joint riverine operations with the U.S. Army and U.S. Coast Guard in 
Bosnia, Bolivia, and Iraq. 
 
Figure 2.  Vietnam era minesweeping drone (from DON 2007). 
Examination of Vietnam War riverine operations also offers insight into the 
United States history of reconfiguring or repurposing landing craft to serve modern 
functions other than what was intended at design. Army troops were typically carried into 
battle aboard a Naval Armored Troop Carrier (ATC), a conventional landing craft with 
special added armor to protect the troops during close-in firefights. “A number of the 
ATCs were modified by the addition of a helicopter pad over the forward part of the boat, 
making them the Navy’s smallest ‘aircraft carrier.’ These ‘mini-carriers’ were used for 
quick resupply and for speedy evacuation of wounded personnel during combat” (NHHC 
2014) (see Figure 3). Additionally, four Landing Craft Mechanized (LCM-6s) were 
reconfigured as “refuelers” that carried both helicopter and small-boat fuel. One 
“refueler” had a helicopter pad (NHHC 2014). Key takeaways from an analysis of 
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Vietnam era use of landing craft are the proven ability of landing craft to act as a 
resupply platform for U.S. troops, and also the added benefit of landing craft when used 
to control the flow of enemy supplies, and troops in riverine conflict.  
 
 
Figure 3.  Vietnam War era landing craft converted to a helicopter landing 
platform (from NHHC 2014).  
3. Humanitarian Operations, Building Partnerships, and Global 
Security 
Natural disasters and political around the world in recent times have created 
instances in which the U.S. Navy is called by friends and allies to aid in the swift 
stabilization, protection, and restoration of their way of life. Often in these instances, 
countries need a reliable, heavy-lift, maritime asset capable of carrying large numbers of 
citizens and supplies. With the flexibility to carry 400 passengers or a 180 ton payload of 
equipment and supplies, the LCU and other similar landing craft are in high demand for 
humanitarian assistance, disaster recover (HA/DR) operations.  
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In 2006, in the midst of an international crisis, the United States evacuated 
thousands of U.S. citizens from Beirut, Lebanon to Cyprus with LCU craft at the core of 
the Naval operations moving thousands of people from the shore to the sea-based 
evacuation ships (GAO 2007) (see Figure 4). Later, when a catastrophic earthquake 
devastated the island nation of Haiti in 2010, the United States responded with an HA/DR 
operation including five LCU (Chief of Naval Operations Assessments Directorate 
(OPNAV N81) 2011). 
 
Figure 4.  U.S. evacuees leaving Lebanon in 2006 via LCU (from GAO 
2007), taking advantage of the 400 passenger,  
180 ton payload capacity. 
Beyond assisting humans in distress, in HA/DR situations, the LCU USV may 
also be used for disaster recovery operations in which it is less likely that human life is at 
stake. In 2008, a manned LCU was used to deliver hay to stranded cattle on a beach in 
Galveston, Texas following Hurricane Ike (NavSource 2013). More recently, the Navy 
employed an unmanned maritime vehicle in the March 2014 recovery effort after the 
unexplained disappearance of a commercial airliner, Malaysian Airlines Flight 370 
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(Associated Press 2014). Combining the effectiveness of a USV with an LCU hull can 
bring significant added value to such Naval operations.  
4. Modern-Day International Naval Challenges 
There are two modern-day challenges for which the United States needs to 
account for present and future uncertainty. First, as other nations gain greater ability to 
project blue-water sea power beyond their borders and coastal regions, the United States 
must prepare sufficiently to mitigate new risks that arise as modern militaries make 
competitive gains. Second, the United States must make a concerted, deliberate effort to 
increase its ability to maintain Naval superiority against counterterrorism in the littorals, 
the deep-sea of the blue-water navies, and the rivers and inland waterways of the 
brown/green-water navies. These two issues are prevalent in present conflicts related to 
the South China Sea and international counterterrorism efforts.  
a. South China Sea 
 The United States has several areas of interest in or near Chinese territories, 
including the South China Sea and the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. “During 
their January 2011 summit, U.S. President Barack Obama and then-PRC President Hu 
Jintao jointly affirmed that a ‘healthy, stable, and reliable military-to-military relationship 
is an essential part of [their] shared vision for a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive 
U.S.-China relationship’” (DOD 2013). The U.S. DOD seeks to build a military-to-
military relationship with China while encouraging China to cooperate with the greater 
international community in the delivery of public goods (DOD 2013). 
Threatening this military-to-military relationship is the Chinese People’s 
Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) formidable collection of sea-denial assets. These assets 
are designed to compete against and defeat U.S. military capabilities in the region. Thus, 
the United States must increase its ability to identify and defeat these forces if necessary.  
As the PLAN capabilities increase, its strength is able to directly enhance China’s 
ability to enforce its interests and eventually alter the balance of power in the region. The 
United States needs to continue peaceful diplomatic approaches to China on issues of 
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territoriality, sovereignty, and trade in the South China Sea (Small 2002). In addition, the 
United States ought to contemplate supporting cooperative ventures between the 
American and Chinese navies, while continuing to maintain a viable naval presence in the 
Asia-Pacific to counter China’s growing naval presence (Small 2002). 
Although there is a need to maintain cooperative, peaceful relations with China, 
and other nations of the South China Sea, there is a concurrent need to be prepared for 
dissention and conflict. Speaking of a recent Chinese blockade of the South China Sea, 
Reuters said, “The United States says it is troubled by China’s blockade, calling it a 
‘provocative move’. China’s Foreign Ministry on Thursday criticized Washington for 
getting involved” (Reuters 2014). 
As recently as 2007, the United States participated in exercises in support of 
Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism (SEACAT) 2007. SEACAT is a weeklong 
naval exercise between the United States and six Southeast Asia nations that allows 
participating nations to apply maritime security tactics in dynamic threat situations 
(Alvarez 2007). 
The Future Unmanned Naval Systems (FUNS) Wargame Competition held in 
2011 is an endeavor relevant to this topic.  The FUNS wargame was designed to 
challenge and showcase the abilities of NPS students and faculty by working through 
problems of critical interest to the U.S. Navy.  Three competitive teams of military 
officers explored the current and expected capabilities of unmanned systems to conduct 
coordinated operations, with minimal human supervision, posed in a naval conflict that 
was set five years in the future.  Autonomous systems of interest include submerged, 
surfaced, airborne and space-based robots as well as advanced sensors and deployable 
networks.  The FUNS wargame thus examined the key capabilities, challenges and 
shortfalls of unmanned systems as a major component of fleet operations. Multiple 
innovative developmental possibilities, concepts of operations, conclusions and 
recommendations for future work were produced.  Lessons learned hold broad interest for 
both Navy and industry stakeholders (Brutzman et al. 2011). 
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“In concert with its allies and partners, the United States will continue adapting its 
forces, posture, and operational concepts to maintain a stable and secure Asia-Pacific 
security environment” (DOD 2013). The U.S. Navy operations in Asia are continuing to 
develop and evolve. Part of this development must include adaptable forces.  
b. International Counter-Terrorism 
With the proliferation of terrorist activities against the United States and its allies 
around the world, there is an increasing demand to be ready to respond to unpredictable 
attacks on citizens and natural resources. the United States regularly conducts 
international cooperative exercises to prepare for potential crime via the sea. For instance, 
the Navy conducted counter-terrorism exercises and deployments in Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba in 2004 (Matlock 2004) and in the Mediterranean Ocean in 2006 (Cartwright 2006). 
In recent years, the U.S. Navy has conducted Maritime Security Operations 
(MSO) in the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Red Sea, and 
Indian Ocean which help set the conditions for security and stability in the maritime 
environment, as well as complement the counter-terrorism and security efforts of regional 
nations (U.S. Navy Chief of Information 2014). 
D. DEFINITION OF AN LCU 
To help explain the value of reuse and repurposing, this thesis details a case study 
utilizing a Landing Craft Utility (LCU). The Landing Craft Utility (LCU), 1610 class, 
was built in the 1970s as an update of the landing craft made famous during the island-
hopping amphibious campaign of World War II. The LCU is 135 feet long and can carry 
180 tons of equipment or 400 combat equipped Marines at 12 Knots. These vessels are 
normally transported into theater in the well decks of L-Class amphibious ships; 
however, organic messing and berthing facilities for its crew of 13 (including 2 Officers) 
enable self-sustained at sea operations in excess of seven days.  
The LCU transports troops, equipment and sustainment to and from the shore and 
amphibious shipping or a seabase. In an amphibious operation, LCUs typically deliver 
personnel and equipment after the initial assault waves. Originally constructed for 
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amphibious assault operations, LCUs have proven to be highly adaptable for many uses 
including surf-zone salvage, large capacity movement of personnel and vehicles as in 
humanitarian assistance or non-combatant evacuation, as platforms for underwater 
testing, harbor and seabase security patrols, delivery of sustainment, coastal surveillance, 
riverine and boat haven operations.  
These vessels have bow ramps for onload/offload, and can be linked bow to stern 
to create a temporary roll-through pier-like structure or perform stern-                              
gate marriages to amphibious well deck ships. Welded steel hull construction and diesel 
propulsion provide high durability and fuel economy. The machinery layout also provides 
built-in redundancy in the event of battle damage, with two engine rooms separated by a 
watertight bulkhead to permit limited operation in the event one engine room is disabled. 
A stern anchor system is installed on the starboard side to assist in retracting after 
beaching.  
The LCU affords heavy-lift, endurance and independent operations when speed is 
not the driving requirement. The LCU remains a valuable and complementary platform in 
the context of expeditionary operations and surface logistics support of forces ashore. 
The current U.S Navy Landing Craft Utility (LCU) 1610 Class is planned for 
replacement between 2017–2023. Upon deactivation, conceivably, these assets can be 
repurposed as controllable USVs and used for many more years.  
E. HISTORY OF THE USV 
The case study presented in this thesis converts an LCU to an unmanned surface 
vehicle (USV). Thus, it is necessary to understand the history and definition of the USV.  
The first successful USV vehicle development and demonstration is credited to 
Nikola Tesla (see Figure 5). In 1898, Tesla designed, developed, patented, and 
demonstrated a remote controlled boat at an exhibition at Madison Square Garden in New 
York (Motwani 2012). 
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Figure 5.  Radio-controlled boat built by Tesla (from Motwani 2012). 
Unmanned surface vehicles have been used in U.S. Naval operations since the 
1940s. “World War II saw the first experimentation with Unmanned Surface Vehicles 
(USVs). Canadians developed the COMOX torpedo concept in 1944 as a pre-Normandy 
invasion USV designed to lay smoke during the invasion—as a substitute for aircraft” 
(Quoted in Natter 2009). Following World War II, the United States developed and used 
USVs for purposes such as minesweeping and battle damage assessment (BDA) (James 
2012).  
At the same time, the U.S. Navy developed several converted landing craft 
intended for mine-clearing operations. It is unknown whether or not these craft, named 
the “Bobsled,” “Porcupine,” and “Woofus 120,” were ever successfully demonstrated or 
used in an operational environment. However, in the 1960s, the U.S. Navy did 
successfully conduct development of several USV target drones (Bertram n.d.) 
While USVs date back at least to World War II, it is only in the 1990s that a large 
proliferation of projects appears (Corfield and Young 2006). This is a paradigm shift and 
technological progression in the U.S. Navy with an increased focus on littoral warfare 
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and anti-terrorism missions (Bertram n.d.). Successful missions of USVs in the global 
war on terrorism have increased interest in USVs within the U.S. Navy and several other 
modern, international navies. 
F. DEFINITION OF A USV 
In order to understand the problem of repurposing an LCU as a USV, it is first 
necessary to detail how unmanned surface vehicles are used in the Navy today. 
Understanding the definition and concept of employment for different types of USVs 
provides a benchmark for development of the capability set and concept of operations for 
an LCU USV. The 2007 Unmanned Surface Vehicle Master Plan defines four main 
classes of USV. USVs are typically defined with respect to their craft-type, hull size, and 
mission capability (see Table 1). Table 1 describes each of the four classes separating 
them in each column with a different color.  For each class, the table presents its master 




Table 1.   Four USV classes (from DON 2007).  
Missing: heavy-lift USVs. 
There exists a capability gap in the present state of USVs as defined and utilized 
by the U.S. Navy. There is no class envisioned for large-hull, heavy-lift USVs. Given the 
current state of U.S. Navy USVs, this thesis elicits a requirement for a fifth class of USV 
defined as a class of rugged, large-hull, heavy-lift assets. The heavy-lift USV is able to 
perform well in Sea Shield Seapower Pillar for its most suitable missions. Furthermore, 
the heavy-lift USV might thrive in the capability gap left by current classes if USVs for 
USV MP priorities Maritime Security (#3), SOF Support (#5), and MIO Support (#7).  
Looking at the secondary mission set for Fleet Class USVs, there are several missions 
which can be classified as or overlap with logistics, and payload delivery mission sets 
(see Table 2).  
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Table 2.   USV class definitions (from DON 2007). 
This thesis defines a fifth class of USV notionally as the “Rugged-Class.” The 
“Rugged Class” of USV is a large-hull, heavy-lift, ruggedized USV. The class represents 
USVs that are at least the length of a patrol boat, ~30m or greater. It is primarily meant to 
operate at the lower-end of the Range of Military Operations (ROMO), although that 
likely depends on the variant (see Figure 6). Variants of the “Rugged Class” might be 
based on high-end combatant vessels in which case it may be suitable for missions in the 
higher ROMO. Arrows in Figure 6 show the operational trend or mission likelihood for a 
particular group.  The colors show conflict intensity with green being the least intense 
and red being the most intense. 
 “X-Class”: A small, non-standard class of systems capable of supporting SOF 
requirements and MIO missions. It provides a “low-end” Intelligence, Surveillance, 
Reconnaissance (ISR) capability to support manned operations and is launched from 
small manned craft such as the 11m Rigid Inflatable Boat (RIB) or the Combat Rubber 
Raiding Craft (CRRC) (U.S. Department of the Navy (DON) 2007). 
 
 “Harbor Class”: Based on the Navy Standard 7m RIB and is focused on the MS 
Mission, with a robust ISR capability and a mix of lethal and non-lethal armament. 
The “Harbor Class” USV can be supported by the majority of our Fleet, since it will 
use the standard 7m interfaces (U.S. Department of the Navy (DON) 2007). 
 
“Snorkeler Class”: A ~7m semi-submersible vehicle (SSV) which supports MCM 
towing (search) missions, ASW (Maritime Shield) and is also capable of supporting 
special missions that can take advantage of its relatively stealthy profile (U.S. 
Department of the Navy (DON) 2007). 
 
“Fleet Class”: A purpose-built USV, consistent with the handling equipment and 
weight limitations of the current 11m RIB. Variants of the Fleet Class will support 
MCM Sweep, Protected Passage ASW, and “high-end” Surface Warfare missions 
(U.S. Department of the Navy (DON) 2007). 
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Figure 6.  Range of military operations (ROMO) (from OPNAV N81 2011). 
G. LEVELS OF AUTONOMY  
In order to repurpose and LCU as a USV, it is necessary to understand the options 
with respect to autonomy. In general, three levels of autonomy are defined: manual, semi-
autonomous and fully autonomous (U.S. Department of the Navy (DON) 2007). 
However, to adequately describe autonomy within the context of this study, this thesis 
defines four levels of autonomy: 
Fully Autonomous: Not remote controlled, completely preprogrammed mission 
from deployment to retrieval, monitored but no operator interference, no personnel 
onboard.  
Semi-Autonomous: Personnel must control more difficult missions remotely 
(e.g., payload deployment, self-defense, and evasive maneuvers); easier missions and 
navigation are autonomous and preprogrammed, no personnel onboard. 
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Remote Controlled: Non-autonomous, all systems controlled by a remote 
operator, no personnel onboard. 
Autopilot: Personnel onboard vessel with option to program and 
activate/deactivate autonomous system operations. 
Autonomous vehicles have the ability to make decisions based on pre-
programmed algorithms, or receive commands via tether or wireless signal, via line-of-
sight or over-the-horizon transmissions. Although autonomy provides benefits such as 
manning reductions, the associated dangers are numerous. Any increase in autonomous 
behavior obviously increases the risks to safety of the USV and associated personnel 
(Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division, Detachment Norfolk (NSWC-CD-
DN) 2012). Thus, it is important to realize that many autonomous systems can operate 
with varying types of autonomy depending on the mission need. Tradeoffs must be 
considered when examining levels of autonomy for USVs.  
H. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis examines the systematic, and effective application of Open Systems 
Architecture (OSA) principles as a tool for effectively managing a traditional systems 
engineering methodology. The thesis then goes on to illustrate this application via a case 
study in which an existing, flexible asset, the Landing Craft Utility (LCU) vessel is 
repurposed into a flexible unmanned surface vehicle (USV).  
The primary question answered in this thesis is, “How must the concepts of open 
systems architecture (OSA) be applied within the context of a traditional systems 
engineering methodology to result in the production of a repurposed, flexible system that 
supports the Defense enterprise in maintaining the competitive advantage?” 
Answering this larger question is accomplished by exploring the answers to 





Table 3.   Research questions for thesis. 
I. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis focuses on the derivation of a generalizable set of considerations and 
processes for the effective implementation of OSA. It marries the existing principles and 
methodologies of OSA and SE to derive new principles, considerations, and concepts. 
Although a specific case study is presented, this thesis is not intended to present an in-
depth engineering analysis and design of the LCU USV system. Any principles put forth 
from the case study are meant as illustrations for proof and substantiation of general 
concepts. 
The case study in this thesis examines the systems engineering process for 
developing LCU USV. This thesis does not focus heavily on a particular final design for 
the LCU USV. It does not significantly address production and fabrication of a final 
design. This thesis does not examine the reengineering of payloads to marry with the 
LCU USV. This thesis does present a template for further program management, using 
OSA, which is applicable to the LCU and possibly other vessels of opportunity as 
identified. 
J. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I presents an overview of the problem, and gives basic information to 
establish a frame of reference for the reader.  
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Chapter II presents related work on the subjects of Open Systems Architecture; 
unmanned and autonomous vehicle concepts; and repurposed, flexible, and modular 
naval systems. 
Chapter III builds upon previous work to develop the most important questions 
that must be asked in implementing OSA. It goes on to explain how these questions must 
be answered for effectiveness within the context of the systems engineering process.  
Chapter IV presents a case study in the applying the principles of OSA within the 
systems engineering process of converting an LCU to a USV. 
Chapter V presents a business case analysis (BCA) that analyzes feasibility of 
converting an LCU to a USV, and analyzes the effectiveness of applying the OSA 
principles within the process of converting an LCU to a USV. 
Chapter VI summarizes the conclusions from this thesis, and offers 
recommendations for further study.  
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II. RELATED WORK 
This chapter presents several related works that may be leveraged to explain, and 
guide the use of OSA and SE in reusing existing Naval assets, including the development 
of unmanned technologies. In order to understand the methodology, and potential end-
goal for developing the LCU USV, it helps to understand what work has been completed 
to-date regarding related concepts. The LCU USV concept crosses multiple high-value 
Defense and Naval initiatives. These initiatives include the development of unmanned 
systems; the development flexible, modular ship systems; and the development of open 
systems architecture (OSA) practices.  
A. DEFINITIONS  
In order to adequately present previous works, this thesis first defines terms that 
have been used throughout the literature with respect to the payloads over platforms 
concept. There seems to be significant overlap in the definitions of flexible design, open 
architecture, and modular design. Understanding the differences and interplay between 
these concepts helps to understand the detailed implications of previous works. Defining 
these terms aids in differentiating between several closely related concepts throughout 
this analysis.  
1. Flexibility 
Flexibility in a system is characterized by the ability of the system’s internal 
components to adapt in response to a change (Wilds 2008). A Flexible Design 
Opportunity (FDO) is a physical component enabling flexibility in a system (Cardin 
2008).  
2. Open Architecture 
Open Architecture (OA) is the concept of maintaining non-proprietary interfaces, 
government data rights, and interoperability protocols in the contracting, architecture, and 
business process methodology used to develop and acquire systems (DOD 2011, DOD 
2013).  
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3. Service-Oriented Architecture 
Service-oriented architecture (SOA) is a specific way of designing software, in a 
standardized architecture, that uses interchangeable and interoperable software 
components called services (DOD 2011). 
4. Module 
A module is an “independent building block of a larger system with well-defined 
interfaces. A module is connected to the rest of the system in a manner that allows 
independent development of the module as long as the interconnections at the interfaces 
meet the established standards” (Cheung 2010). 
5. Module Station 
A module station is “a volume reserved within a controlled portion of a functional 
area and designed to accommodate the installation of a module. The station [provides] 
support connections that mate with the module; both module and module station 
conforming to the same interface standard” (Cheung 2010). 
6. Modularity 
The term modularity is used to characterize “a design approach in which a system 
is functionally partitioned into discrete, scalable and reusable modules consisting of 
isolated, self-contained elements. The system is designed with standardized interfaces, 
dimensions, and performance parameters for easy assembly, repair and flexibility” 
(Cheung 2010). 
7. Open System 
An open system is “a system that employs modular design and uses consensus-
based, non-proprietary standards for key interfaces” (Cheung 2010). 
B. UNMANNED AND AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE CONCEPTS 
Extensive research has been conducted on unmanned systems for the maritime 
domain. Surface vessels account for a large part of these works. It is imperative to 
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understand the successes, challenges and lessons-learned from these works in order to 
appropriately establish a baseline for development of the LCU USV.  
1. Tailorable Remote Unmanned Combat Craft 
In a 2012 Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) capstone project, a team designed 
and conducted a systems engineering analysis of a family of USVs that can be integrated 
with manned and other unmanned forces to augment, support, and improve a broad 
spectrum of missions (Loren 2014). The project presents three designs for USVs of 
varying sizes and capability. The largest of the designs is depicted in Figure 7. The report 
provides insight into the unique architectural, operational availability, and legal issues 
surrounding large USV development.  
 
Figure 7.  USV Model-Large (91–200 feet in length). Compared to an existing 
naval vessel of similar size (from Loren 2014).  
This thesis recommends that further study be conducted to continue the pursuit of 
an open architecture standard for connecting USVs with other, dissimilar systems. The 
thesis goes on to recognize that open architecture (OA) is valuable to fielding a USV 
system, but OA is not the sole factor in achieving full autonomy.  
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With respect to survivability and availability requirements, the study recommends 
implementing large numbers of lower-cost vessels in order to achieve greater combat 
capability. In order to establish metrics for reliability, the report proposes use of 
reliability paradigms from aviation and space industries, because mid-mission system 
failures are mission critical for USVs. 
Finally, the capstone project recommends developing legal test cases to explore 
the consequences of autonomous machines, specifically highlighting the issues of 
foreseeable harm and tort liability. 
2. MSHIPCO Mistral USV  
MSHIPCO, a commercial company from San Diego, CA, has designed and built 
an advanced 15-meter unmanned platform, the Mistral USV, featuring the Stiletto M-hull 
Technology, user-friendly control interface and composite material (PRWEB 2013) (see 
Figure 8). This company proves the importance and effectiveness of using existing naval 
designs combined with open architecture, flexible configurations, and commercial 
standards. This work also presents the concept of waypoint control or mother-ship control 
for a convoy or swarm of USVs acting in concert.  
 
Figure 8.  Mistral USVs in formation to perform a mission in coordinated 
formation (from PRWEB 2013).  
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3. Development of Unmanned Surface Vehicle for Sea Patrol and 
Environmental Monitoring 
A 2012 study conducted an analysis of structural elements, control systems, 
software, and hardware necessary for development of a USV sea patrol and 
environmental monitoring (see Figure 9) (Yaakob 2012). This work shows that the state-
of-the-practice has advanced to the point where a USV can be suitably built and operated 
with simple, affordable, commercially available technologies. Figure 9 shows a 
representative electronic control system. Boxes enclose the two parts of the system, and 
thin lines represent wired connection.  The thick line represents a wireless connection. 
 
Figure 9.  Hardware setup for a commercial USV control system  
(from Yaakob 2012). 
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4. Mine Hunter Sweeping Vessel  
In his Naval Postgraduate School master’s thesis, Tom Gough (2013) examined 
the notion of designing a vessel around its internal systems instead of first designing a 
hull form, and then attempting to backfit the internal systems. The main idea is that the 
payload determines the size, capability, and power requirements of the host vessel. The 
thesis applied this idea within the context of a notional, commercially available, mine 
countermeasures vessel called the mine hunter sweeping vessel (MHSV). 
This thesis suggests looking for cost-effective ways to monitor surface and 
subsurface events on a national level as well as increasing intelligence on threats. It also 
suggests that, for mine sweeping missions, future studies need to examine removing 
humans from the mine countermeasures (MCM) platform vessel, backfitting an 
autonomous control system in order to lower risk and increase mission flexibility. Given 
that the LCU may be a suitable platform for mine countermeasures payloads and 
missions, it stands to reason that the LCU USV, for use in MCM and other missions, 
ought to be examined as a potential solution to the requirements set put forth by Tom 
Gough.  
5. Repurposed Naval Asset: SSN USV Launch Tube 
A capstone project (Calvert et al. 2011) from the Naval Postgraduate School 
demonstrated the use of the systems engineering methodology to repurpose an existing 
asset, a Naval submarine torpedo tube, for future missions involving an integrated 
mechanism for the launch and recovery of unmanned underwater vehicles. The LCU, by 
original design, is a platform that can support a wide array of payloads. With the 
alteration to make the LCU into a USV, the options for these payloads become even 
broader.  
Calvert et al. (2011) draw attention to the fact that many technologically advanced 
payloads such as UUVs or USVs may not yet be mature. Furthermore, the payloads may 
have rapidly evolving architectures that must be accommodated by the platform.  
The key takeaway from this work is that studies need to focus on the flexibility 
and modularity of platforms in order to support incremental changes to technologically 
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advanced payloads. This project also suggested that maintaining close relationships with 
payload designers and manufactures is necessary in order to limit the risks to acquisition 
and performance.  
Extending this notion to the LCU USV suggests that every effort need to be taken 
to ensure that the inherent flexibility in an LCU is used to the maximum extent when 
operating as a manned or unmanned platform. Additionally, a key to ensuring this takes 
place is identifying the correct stakeholders, and maintaining a close relationship with 
them to track changing requirements and capabilities.  
6. NPS Consortium for Robotics and Unmanned Systems Education and 
Research (CRUSER) and the Wave Glider USV 
The Consortium for Robotics and Unmanned Systems Education and Research 
(CRUSER) at the Naval Postgraduate School provides an interface for academia to 
address the unmanned systems needs of the Department of Defense. Many of the 
CRUSER initiatives aim to advance the study and fielding of unmanned systems, 
including USVs.  
CRUSER has several projects that are conceptually related to the LCU USV. 
Notable CRUSER studies include the U.S. Coast Guard Unmanned Maritime System 
(USCG UMS) and the Wave Glider USV. The concepts, results, and suggestions from 
these studies can be used in the methodology to develop the LCU USV.  
In 2013, U.S. Coast Guard LT James B. Zorn completed a thesis, in association 
with the CRUSER, which presented a systems engineering analysis of unmanned 
maritime systems for U.S. Coast Guard missions. This thesis stepped through the systems 
engineering analysis of such a system by performing a capability analysis, an analysis of 
alternative architectures, and a feasibility analysis of certain key system enablers. This 
study laid a foundation for future study of key enabler costs, and life cycle costs 
associated with unmanned maritime systems. This study also highlighted the need to put 
further study into UMS policy, interoperability, and mission overlap (Zorn 2013).  
The CRUSER has a variety of studies that examine increasing the utility of 
Unmanned Surface Vehicles. Another program of note in the CRUSER is the Wave 
 28
Glider USV Program (NPS 2014). The Wave Glider USV highlights the robust, 
reconfigurable, open systems architecture payload possibilities of USVs for cross-domain 
scientific and operational missions. The CRUSER Wave Glider studies prompt further 
study of the use of USVs in acoustical tracking, command and control, communication, 
environmental data collection, and at-sea visualization support. The University of Hawaii 
is also conducting such research using Wave Gliders (see Figure 10). The research at this 
university shows the open architecture of the Wave Glider USV platform, its ability to 
accommodate varying payloads, and the simplicity of the unmanned control systems.  
 
Figure 10.  Wave Glider USV from the University of Hawaii shown with open 
payload bays and exposed command and control systems  
(photo taken by author). 
C. REPURPOSED, FLEXIBLE, AND MODULAR NAVAL SYSTEMS 
There are several works that demonstrate the value in aiming for flexibility and 
modularity in both new and repurposed naval systems. These works span the range of 
naval systems from combatants, to amphibious, to notional research systems.  
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1. LCU as a Force Multiplier in the Littorals 
Other scholarly works have recognized the Landing Craft Utility as an 
underutilized platform for Naval operations. One 2001 NPS master’s thesis presented a 
case for the use of LCU as a force multiplier in the littorals (Bottelson 2001). Scholarly 
works such as this highlight the value of strategic repurposing of existing Naval assets. It 
examined “ways to make more effective use of scarce assets in the areas the Navy/Marine 
Corps team is most likely to conduct future operations in the littorals” (Bottelson 2001). 
This paper proposed that “a small amphibious landing craft like the Landing Craft Utility 
(LCU) can be used as a more cost-effective alternative to close exposure to enemy 
attack” (Bottelson 2001). 
This paper also mentioned many suitable missions for the LCU operation in 
littoral waters. Amongst those missions named as the most suitable are riverine 
operations, maritime prepositioned force onload/offload, maritime interdiction 
operations, force protection operations; deception van platform operations; crypto, 
signals, intelligence and electronic support platform; communications relay platform; and 
choke point monitoring and surveillance. 
While this paper does not address the value of a landing craft repurposed as a 
USV, it does highlight the value of continued use of these assets as an augmentation to an 
existing battle group, ready group, or strike group asset or mission.  
In the event that a successful enemy attack is carried out, the loss of or 
damage to a $15 million landing craft with a crew of 11 will be easier to 
mitigate than the loss of a $1 billion state-of-the-art destroyer and a crew 
of 350. It may also have less overall effect on strategic and operational 
decision-making and the will to respond. Though this seems a callous 
approach, the overriding concerns of military leaders are to limit the loss 
of life and equipment while attaining mission accomplishment. (Bottelson 
2001) 
This paper draws attention to the fact that the LCU, unmanned or manned, can 
handle much wider scope of missions than a traditional USV as currently exists in the 
Navy fleet. The LCU can also supplement a small subset of the missions with which 
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surface combatant ships may be tasked in the littorals. Finally, the LCU missions can be 
extended into smaller, shallower riverine environments.  
Bottelson suggests that the true value of the LCU may be in its mission flexibility 
and low consequence of realized damage/loss. Furthermore, this thesis sets the stage for 
investigating an LCU USV by highlighting the inherent reduction of risk via reduced 
manning.  
2. Scalar Common Affordable Modular Platform (SCAMP) 
In his 2012 Massachusetts Institute of Technology master’s thesis, Jon Page 
conducted an analysis of options for flexibility in early stage design of U.S. Navy ships 
(Page 2011). The basis of this thesis is a notional vessel called the Scalar Common 
Affordable Modular Platform (SCAMP). 
This thesis recognizes that future demands on Navy assets, such as new missions, 
altered missions, and increased capability needs, are likely to be unknowns at the time of 
the vessel’s design. It presents methodologies with which to avoid costly engineering 
changes by incorporating flexibility into the design and architecture of Naval vessels. The 
thesis applies a rigorous analysis framework to examine the cost effectiveness of flexible 
options.  
In the conclusion of the thesis, the author mentions that the Navy might benefit 
from application of this type of flexibility analysis to platforms other than medium 
displacement surface combatants. Amphibious vessels provide an interesting platform for 
studying service life allowances and design margins. Analysis of design options has the 
potential to alter future amphibious designs, including landing craft, to account for these 
types of changes.  
3. Flexible Ship War Room and Roadmap  
In 2013, the Director of Surface Warfare (OPNAV N96) led a 90-day effort called 
the Flexible and Common Warship War Room to examine the feasibility of building 
future ships with increased levels of modularity, commonality, and open systems with an 
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objective of achieving greater flexibility and cost-efficiency over the life cycle (Program 
Executive Office Ships (PEO Ships) 2014). 
This effort notes several concepts and technologies that contribute to 
accomplishing the flexible ships objectives in the Flexible Ships Roadmap. The roadmap 
details that a flexible system includes aspects of flexibility, modularity, scalability, and 
commonality. It goes on to discuss payload-platform decoupling, flexible payloads, 
flexible ship technologies and architectures, flexible acquisition strategies, and key 
flexibility enablers. This document suggests that any good flexibility-based systems 
engineering approach accounts for as many tenets of the flexible ship concept as possible 
while striking the optimal balance between opportunities and return on investment to the 
system sponsor (i.e., the Navy).  
D. OPEN SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE 
There are several initiatives that are important to the discussion of open systems 
architecture as defined above. Better Buying Power, the OSA Guidebook, and the NPS 
Business Innovation Initiative are amongst those initiatives. 
1. Better Buying Power (BBP) 
Better Buying Power (BBP) is a DOD initiative that encourages system managers 
to set cost targets below independent cost estimates and manage with the intent to achieve 
them. The DOD Better Buying Power initiative suggests that the combination of open 
architecture and an open business model permits the acquisition of open systems 
architectures that yield modular, interoperable systems allowing components to be added, 
modified, replaced, removed and/or supported by different vendors throughout the life 
cycle in order to drive opportunities for enhanced competition and innovation (DOD 
2014). 
In this age of increasingly software-centric systems, it is important to make sure 
that future architects have access to all of the information needed to properly rearchitect 
systems that are built today. If obstacles are in place preventing access, then 
consequences can be costly, and architects are forced to reinvent previous achievements. 
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Open architectures help program managers, and end users avoid vendor lock. 
Vendor lock, or vendor lock-in, is the situation in which customers are dependent on a 
single manufacturer or supplier for a product (i.e., a good or service), or products, and 
cannot move to another vendor without substantial costs and/or inconvenience. This 
dependency is typically a result of standards that are controlled by the vendor (i.e., 
manufacturer or supplier). It can grant the vendor some extent of monopoly power and 
can thus be much more profitable than  be experienced in the absence of such 
dependency (The Linux Information Project. 2006).  
2. DOD OSA GUIDEBOOK FOR PMS 
The DOD Open Systems Architecture Contract Guidebook for Program Managers 
provides guidance for program managers to properly utilize OSA business and technical 
practices in system acquisitions. The guidebook prompts PMs to incorporate OSA-based 
principles into program requirements, statements of work, contract line items, intellectual 
property and data rights negotiations, and ongoing life cycle competition considerations. 
(U.S. DOD OSA Data Rights Team 2013) 
Properly fielding the LCU USV requires cooperation amongst both the technical 
systems engineering and program management disciplines. Bringing program managers 
into sync with the technical OSA guidance requires altering traditional program 
management techniques. A major tool for doing this is the DOD Open Systems 
Architecture Guidebook for Program Managers (see Figure 11).  
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Figure 11.  Contract Guidebook for Program Managers v1.1  
(from U.S. DOD OSA Data Rights Team 2013). 
3. Bii MMOWGLI OSA War Game 
A key factor in developing the LCU USV system is the implementation of new 
business practices for government and industry. Maximizing the value of such an asset 
requires not just a sound engineering approach, but complementary business 
considerations as well.  
One such effort to develop these business approaches is the Open Architecture 
(OA) Business Innovation Initiative (BII) Massive Multiplayer Online War Game 
Leveraging the Internet (MMOWGLI) sponsored by the DASN RDT&E and NPS. The 
BII aims to move the Naval Enterprise and acquisition community towards an innovative 
business model that supports the “Payloads Over Platforms” open systems architecture 
vision. Initiated in 2012, the OA-BII generates, tests, and deploys recommendations for 
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changes to Government business models that motivate industry to participate in Naval 
OSA strategies (DASN RDT&E and NPS 2014). 
Results from the OA-BII to date recommend that programs aiming to implement 
OSA need to coordinate their OSA strategy across the Naval Enterprise, require 
competition in acquisition, require coordinated technical frameworks, utilize published 
OSA-centric guidance, and address the profit motives of industry (DASN RDT&E and 
NPS 2014). All of these considerations are a key part of developing an optimized 
business environment for fielding the LCU USV system; a business environment in 
which there is decreased life cycle cost and decreased delivery time (Guertin 2014). 
See Appendix E for Bii MMOWGLI Action Plans as derived for the notional 
LCU USV program by several professional players that participated in a recent Bii game 
conducted over the course of two weeks during July 2014.  
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter explained several related works that may be leveraged to guide the 
use of OSA and SE in reusing existing Naval assets, and the development of unmanned 
technologies. This chapter began by showing that it is important to first understand how 
the historical body of literature defines several related terms within the practice and study 
of OSA and unmanned systems. This chapter then showed several related works that 
demonstrated the feasibility of heavy-lift, flexible, and open USVs with simple controls.  
All of these works have direct applicability to the OSA SE efforts necessary for the LCU 
USV. Finally, the chapter explained several business-related OSA works. The BBP 
initiative and Bii MMOWGLI war game give several considerations key to developing an 




III. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING CONSIDERATIONS 
The following chapter provides details regarding how the concepts of open 
systems architecture may be leveraged and applied within the context of an existing, 
traditional systems engineering methodology to result in the production of a flexible 
system that better maintains competitive advantage in the Defense enterprise. Because of 
the broad generality of applying SE methodology and OSA principles to the conversion 
of a manned asset into an unmanned system, this chapter may have wide applicability to 
the potential upgrade of other Naval systems.   
A. GENERAL SYSTEMS ENGINEERING APPROACH 
The Department of Defense issued a directive stating that “Acquisition programs 
shall be managed through the application of a systems engineering approach that 
optimizes total system performance and minimizes total ownership costs. A modular, 
open-systems approach shall be employed, where feasible” (DOD 2003). 
The Department of Defense further explained its Systems Engineering approach 
stating: 
Rigorous systems engineering discipline is necessary to ensure that the 
Department of Defense meets the challenge of developing and maintaining 
needed warfighting capability. Systems engineering provides the 
integrating technical processes to define and balance system performance, 
cost, schedule, and risk within a family-of-systems and systems-of-
systems context. Systems engineering shall be embedded in program 
planning and be designed to support the entire acquisition life cycle. 
(DOD 2008) 
Department of Navy Systems Engineering guidance is given in SECNAVINST 
5000.2E, 1 September 2011. The Navy guidance is drawn directly from DOD Directive 
5000.01 of 12 May 2003 and DOD Instruction 5000.02 of 8 Dec 2008. The United States 
Navy (USN) implements this overarching guidance focusing on its application to 
program management saying, “The Program Manager (PM) shall institute a rigorous 
systems engineering discipline necessary to ensure that the Department of Navy (DON) 
meets the challenge of developing and maintaining needed warfighting capability. The 
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systems engineering approach shall be managed to optimize total system performance 
and minimize Total Ownership Cost (TOC)” (DON 2011). 
B. NAVAL SYSTEMS ENGINEERING APPLICATION METHODOLOGY 
Both the DOD and DON utilize the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG) to 
conduct Systems Engineering in a cohesive manner across the DOD Enterprise. DOD 
Directive 5000.01, DOD Instruction 5000.02, and SECNAVINST 5000.2E provide 
mandatory DOD and DON policy. The Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG) aids 
program stakeholders in implementing the mandatory policy. The DAG provides the best 
practices and other methods by which to develop the information required by policy 
(Defense Acquisition University (DAU) 2014).  
The DAG states that implementation of the SE processes begins with the 
identification of a validated operational need. The DAG models the SE process with the 
V-diagram (see Figure 12). The Diagram models 16 technical processes that comprise a 
systematic approach to managing the success of a program. The technical processes 
ensure that the delivered capability accurately reflects the stakeholder’s needs. The 
diagram guides the systems engineer through the methodology roughly by following the 
arrows as the engineer moves from left to right, and along the “V.” The upper-left of the 
point of the “V” represents the beginning of the systems engineering process. The upper-
right of the point of the “V” represents the beginning of the systems engineering process. 
The two-way arrows show linkages between phases, and that there may be many 
iterations between phases.  The steps contained in boxes with headings may be 
considered the steps necessary for a “balanced approach for delivering capability to the 
warfighter” (DAU 2014). 
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Figure 12.  DOD SE process model as of 2014 (from DAU 2014). 
This thesis uses the DAG systems engineering process model as a basis to identify 
and deliver a fully validated capability. Recognizing that the traditional approach to 
systems engineering may be one contributing factor to the high cost, high complexity, 
and highly integrated systems that we have today, this thesis puts forth the notion that 
traditional SE methodologies must be combined with OSA principles in order to realize 




C. CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS WHEN LEVERAGING OPEN SYSTEMS 
ARCHITECTURE (OSA) IN ASSET REUSE 
OSA facilitates interoperability between systems by effectively leveraging 
“common capability descriptions in system requirements; common, open data models, 
standards, interfaces, and architectures in system design, and common components in 
system acquisition strategies” (DOD 2011). 
In order to achieve maximum openness from a system, the right questions must be 
asked and those questions must be appropriately answered. While it is true that there is no 
guaranteed formula for systems engineering, there are a few questions that must be 
addressed when considering how to effectively repurpose and reuse existing assets. All 
questions must allow stakeholders to evaluate the program with respect to whether or not 
the program has achieved maximum openness.  
OSD defines OA as a multifaceted strategy providing a framework for developing 
joint interoperable systems that adapt and exploit open-system design principles and 
architectures (DOD 2011). This framework includes a set of principles, processes, and 
best practices that provide more opportunities for competition and innovation. This frame 
work helps to rapidly field systems that are affordable, interoperable, minimize total 
ownership cost, optimize total system performance, are easily developed and 
upgradeable, and achieve component software reuse (DOD 2011).  
With respect to Naval and ship systems, more granularity may be added to the 
definition of open systems architecture. OSA in U.S. Naval ship design is more fully 
described as “modularity, and flexibility in open systems” (Marcantonio 2007). OSA 
principles are important implications for naval architects, and provide the basis for the 
first step of the flexible design process: identifying the sources of uncertainty. Flexibility 
is only valuable if it addresses an underlying uncertainty appropriately (Page 2011). The 
interchangeable architecture of system elements, modules, sea frame zones, stations, and 
associated interfaces in an open system is what makes such architecture affordable and 
flexible. 
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The Program Manager’s Guide for the Modular Open Systems Approach 
(MOSA) to architecture outlines five principles that lay the foundation for effective 
incorporation of modularity and open systems. Figure 13 depicts the overall vision of 
MOSA, the five principles, and their associated benefits. The five straight arrows in the 
figure show that there are five principles that must be implemented to achieve the 
combined benefits.  The curved arrows show that both business and technical indicators 
contribute to successful implementation of the MOSA principles.   
 
Figure 13.  Principles and benefits for effective incorporation of modularity and 
open systems (from DOD 2004). 
Table 4 explains the each principle of MOSA in detail. These detailed 




Table 4.    Details of the principles of modular open systems 
architecture (MOSA) (from DOD 2004). 
Today’s principles of OSA have matured out of earlier work like MOSA. OSA 
has both business and technical aspects that must be addressed concurrently throughout 
the systems engineering process. The following questions may be derived to apply the 
principles of OSA to the traditional SE methodology. These questions must be answered 
according to OSA principles in order to provide the best chance of low cost, low risk, and 
technically acceptable program performance. The answers to these questions are based on 
principles found in Better Buying Power, the DOD OSA guidebook, MOSA, as well as 
other heuristic notions that can be applied to optimally answer the questions.  
The following overarching questions must be answered appropriately in order to 
satisfy the principles of open systems architecture. All other questions follow from these 
simple, general questions (see Table 5). 
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Table 5.   Critical overarching OSA considerations. 
Following from these overarching questions several more specific business and 
technical OSA questions may be applied to a program management approach (see Tables 
























After the questions are established, they must be appropriately applied within the 
traditional SE methodology. It ought to be noted that the questions presented in Tables 5, 
6, and 7 are not comprehensive. There are many other questions that may be asked as part 
of an OSA management approach, and each question must be appropriately tailored to the 
applicable program. Multiple questions may apply to each step of the SE process, and 
many questions can be used for more than one step. In general, the OSA technical 
questions need to be asked during the “Technical Processes” steps of the DOD SE 
Process Model. Likewise, OSA business questions need to be asked during the 
“Technical Management Processes” steps of the DOD SE Process Model. See Figure 14 
showing how each set of question is roughly combined with a particular phase of the SE 
methodology. It is the job of the systems engineering manager to appropriately apply the 
OSA approach to managing the program at hand.  
 
Figure 14.  Application of OSA questions to the DOD SE process model  
(after DAU 2014). 
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D. SUMMARY 
This chapter explained how to combine the principles of OSA with the SE process 
methodology. First, this chapter detailed he state-of-the-practice systems engineering 
methodology widely accepted by many Defense organizations. Next, several critical 
considerations for the use of OSA in asset repurposing and reuse were explained.  Central 
to this discussion was the understanding of the principles of MOSA. Following, from the 
discussion of MOSA, this chapter detailed several business and technical questions that 
may be used to guide the implementation of OSA across the SE process.  Important to the 
discussion of the OSA questions, is understanding that these questions must be 
appropriately answered in order to prove valuable within the SE process. Finally, this 
chapter showed those certain questions are best applied to specific phases of the 
traditional SE process. The next chapter applies this methodology in a case study.  
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IV. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING APPLICATION AND ANALYSIS: 
LCU USV MISSION 
This chapter applies the principles of OSA to systems engineering methodology 
of converting an Landing Craft Utility (LCU) to an Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV).  
A. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
Reuse is the highest form of waste reduction and has the potential to 
increase the product’s end-of-life value. Reuse may be most easily 
justified in the case of […] high manufacturing costs, long innovation 
cycles or lifetimes, […]. (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 556) 
The goal of this thesis is to present a variation on the traditional systems 
engineering methodology, in that this work is a reengineering analysis that aims to 
repurpose an existing Naval platform rather than simply to repair or modernize the 
existing platform for use in the same mission set.  
This analysis examines the use of an existing LCU converted into an unmanned 
surface vehicle (USV) for employment as a low cost, high capacity, rugged force 
augmentation to the existing USVs. Furthermore, this analysis examines the unmanned 
LCU’s suitability as a truck for various payloads. The analysis concentrates on changes 
necessary to rearchitect the LCU platform to be autonomous and accommodate varying 
traditional and non-traditional USV payloads. The goal is to avoid rearchitecting existing, 
traditional payloads that are designed for operation from a USV. In other words, this 
analysis examines rearchitecting the platform to accommodate unaltered, existing 
payloads.  
B. DEFINITION OF PROBLEM 
In order to further define and understand the problem, it is necessary to clearly 
ascertain the given inputs that define the starting point. For this purpose, the givens may 
be modeled through the use of a systems engineering black box model, initial system 
requirements, and existing LCU characteristics. 
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1. Input–Output Model 
The Systems Engineering Black Box Model is the starting point for ensuring that 
the end-goal of the systems engineering process is clearly understood. The black box is 
the place where the requirements are strategically combined with energy, matter, 
material, and information (EMMI) to produce the desired outcome. In the case of system 
reuse, there is another element input to the black box that is not found in systems 
engineering applications for newly acquired systems. The original system must be an 
input to the black box. Its current condition, scope, and purpose largely influences what is 
possible for the output. In the case of the LCU USV, the inputs are the LCU, EMMI, and 
requirements as applied through the process of open systems architecture (OSA) (see 
Figure 15). 
 
Figure 15.  LCU USV systems engineering black box. 
2. Requirements 
There are several documents that emphasize the need for a craft like the LCU 
USV. Because the need is plainly stated in several DOD references to date, the DOD may 
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naturally draft requirements for a program of record for the LCU USV. The requirement 
for an LCU USV is also rooted in a tenet of the 21st Century Seapower doctrine, 
“preventing war is just as important as winning wars” (U.S. Department of the Navy and 
U.S. Department of the Coast Guard 2007). 
The National Military Strategy (NMS) amplifies this need. The NMS explains 
that the military must field modular, adaptive, general-purpose forces and systems that 
play a role in covering the full range of military operations. These forces and systems 
must pose an increasingly expeditionary capability. They must have a smaller logistics 
footprint, and they must help reduce fuel and energy demands. Additionally, the forces 
and systems must ensure access and freedom of maneuver. Finally, these forces and 
systems must be increasingly interoperable with other services (DOD 2011). 
Unmanned systems have provided an unprecedented force multiplier to troops to 
date. The Joint Unmanned Systems Roadmap for 2011–2036 further corroborates the 
need for a vessel such as the LCU USV by emphasizing the need for affordable, 
convergent unmanned systems. The Roadmap says that the cost of unmanned systems 
must be low enough to be expendable, and allow commanders to take risks. It goes on to 
say that unmanned systems must support diverse mission sets through the use of joint, 
interoperable payloads, platforms, architectures, and capabilities (DOD 2011).  
3. LCU General Characteristics 
The LCU is a simple, rugged and reliable platform that the Navy has entrusted to 
be the workhorse of the amphibious fleet for over four decades. With the proper care and 
maintenance, the steel-hulled vessel can likely last another forty (40) years. See Table 9 




Table 9.   LCU general characteristics (from Program Executive Office 
Ships (PEO Ships) 2012). 
The LCU 1610 Class vessel is a vessel capable of independent operations and 
heavy lift. It has heavier lift capability than air cushioned cargo vehicles or similarly 
sized aircraft.  
It has significantly greater range than any other connector, can serve as staging 
base for small boats, salvage support, port clearing, platform for Buoyant Hose Fuel 
Systems, and a passenger ferry for 400 personnel (Program Executive Office Ships (PEO 
Ships) 2012). It has accommodations for embarked overnight. See Figure 16 for a 
schematic of the LCU 1610 below-deck configuration.  
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Figure 16.  Navy LCU 1610 Class schematic (from Program Executive Office 
Ships (PEO Ships) 2012). 
The general characteristics of the LCU 1610 Class vessel are significant and 
repurposable. Because landing craft have been in production for long periods of time by 
many entities, there is a wide array of design variants that utilize the traditional 
displacement landing craft hullform, general arrangements, and functionality. See 
Appendix A for a survey of landing craft. Beyond landing craft, there are a number of 
other maritime assets that may also leverage some concepts from the conversion of an 
LCU to a USV. Such opportunities are left for further study.  
C. CONSTRAINTS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
In undertaking any systems engineering effort, there are certain constraints to 
which the analysis must adhere. In the case of the LCU USV, the most obvious of the 
constraints is the constraint of the physical and functional limits of the existing platform 
such as volumetric space capacity, general arrangement of structural bulkheads, and 
cargo weight capacity of the hull form.  
 52
The following are other constraints and assumptions that have been determined 
for this systems engineering analysis of the LCU USV (see Table 10): 
 
 
Table 10.   LCU USV systems engineering process constraints and 
assumptions. 
Although this analysis makes several assumptions and constraints, it still remains 
careful not to assume a particular architectural solution too soon in the design cycle.  
D. STAKEHOLDERS IDENTIFICATION AND SURVEY (USERS) 
There are a number of stakeholders that have influence in a system such as the 
LCU USV. Stakeholders may be categorized into several categories to help determine 
their influence in the systems engineering process. First order stakeholders are considered 
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to be those who have direct contact with the system, directly influence the system. 
Second order stakeholders are defined as those who work with or are associated with a 
person in direct contact with the system, or who directly influences the system. Third 
order stakeholders are all others with any minor, or indirect interest in the system.  
The customer, and user of the system, is the first stakeholder touch point. In the 
case of the LCU USV, the customers are the warfighters and other military personnel 
who are responsible for accomplishing the various missions that this vessel is responsible 
for. The warfighters, and users of this system input materials, manpower, and information 
into the system in order to produce and execute the desired mission output.  
System engineering requirements generation requires extensive research and 
conversation with the customer and other members of the stakeholder population. The 
systems engineer must be sure to account for customer uncertainty in exactly what they 
desire in form and function of a final product.  
A selection of first order stakeholders are listed here: Office of Naval Research 
(ONR), Naval Sea Systems Command, Naval Surface Warfare Centers, Office of 
Secretary of Defense (OSD), Sailors, Congress, Amphibious Warfare Commanders, 
Public USV contractors. There are many first order stakeholders who can be involved in 
development of this system in some way including persons in test and evaluation, 
contracting, legislation, environmental design, regulatory, budgeting, taxpayer concerns, 
and more.  
The following paragraphs identify several categories of stakeholders involved in 
the DOD Acquisitions Management Framework. They include system users, technology 
development agencies, acquisition agencies, contractors, planning agencies, test and 
evaluation agencies, policymakers, and academia. The paragraphs discuss the roles each 
stakeholder plays, and can be used as a reference in understanding the subsequent 
explanation of the SE processes. 
System Users: The user community consists of those soldiers and sailors who 
operate the equipment in the AOR, and who best understand the evolving war fighting 
needs. The user community defines the systems and tactics that are required to maintain 
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the competitive advantage in current military operations. Because of their superior 
knowledge of the current operational environment, it is also the user community who is 
the first, and most important voice in establishing funding priorities for military systems. 
See Table 11 for a partial list of users.  
 
 
Table 11.   User community stakeholders. 
Technology Development Agency: The technology development agency is in 
charge of managing a system as it evolves from concept to reality. In the case of the LCU 
USV, and other military systems, the technology development agency is typically a 
government research laboratory, engineering agent, or authoritative technical 
organization. The agency’s engineers, subject matter experts, and managers must assess 
the technology readiness levels of the system until it reaches maturity. After the system is 
transitioned to operational use, the agency is often charged with providing in-service, 
helpdesk-type support to the system throughout the system’s life cycle. The development 
agency must necessarily interact with other stakeholder groups to ensure that stakeholder 
 55
needs are not compromised as the system technology is developed, integrated, and 
fielded. See Table 12 for a partial list of Technology Development Stakeholders.  
 
Table 12.   Technology development stakeholders. 
Acquisition Agency: Acquisition agencies consist of Program Offices, and 
Systems Commands. Acquisition agencies are responsible for ensuring that all statutory 
and regulatory laws, as derived from the Constitution, are enforced in meeting the user 
needs. The agency employs experts in program management, project management, law, 
finance, accounting, contracting, engineering, and other disciplines. It may be noted that 
other stakeholder groups such as technology development agencies, and test agencies 
may be subordinate entities of an acquisition agency. Acquisition agencies are in charge 
of spending the resource sponsor’s (i.e., the user’s) appropriated funds. These funds are 
allocated by the acquisition agency to both government and contractor entities. See Table 
13 for a partial list of Acquisition Agency stakeholders.  
 
Table 13.   Acquisition agency stakeholders. 
Contractors: When in the best interests of the user and the taxpayer, the 
acquisition agency elects to employ contractors to perform portions of the work of system 
acquisition. Contractors are responsible for providing a wide range of products and 
services to the acquisition agency. In turn, the acquisition agency must closely manage 
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the contracts to ensure that the user needs are being met. In the case of the LCU USV, the 
contractors may be used in research, development, concept studies, test, evaluation, 
construction, fabrication, outfitting, business, finance, program management, logistics, 
and many other disciplines.  
Planning Agency: When a system must be modified, the Government employs 
agents to manage the work. Often, these roles may overlap with the technical agency or 
the acquisition agency. The planning agency is responsible for ensuring that the vessel is 
built or modified in a manner that proves efficient for program sponsors and fleet 
resources. The agency may be involved in a number of activities including design, 
drawing, alteration planning, test and evaluation, and negotiating with subcontractors.  
Test & Evaluation Organizations: Test & Evaluation (T&E) organizations can 
be Governmental or independent. They are charged with verifying system performance 
and validating all system requirements before the system is put into operation. Testers 
may also keep measures of system performance throughout the life cycle of the system to 
ensure that measures of effectiveness are improving, or to influence other programmatic 
decisions. The test and evaluation community must work closely with the acquisition 
agency. Furthermore, a test organization may be a subordinate entity to a technology 
development agency, acquisition agency, or planning agency.  
Policymakers: Policymakers include a broad range of both executive and 
legislative organizations and individuals who make and enforce the laws that govern the 
system engineering process. These individuals have the authority to influence program 
direction, requirements, and funding in many different ways. See Table 14 for a partial 
list of Policy Stakeholders.  
 
 
Table 14.   Policy stakeholders. 
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Academia: As an extension of the technical community, universities and other 
academic institutions provide for research and development capabilities that augment 
those capabilities organic to Government Technology Development Agencies.  
E. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS  
“Identifying and analyzing the needs of the stakeholder is referred to as 
stakeholder analysis” (Langford 2012, 259). Stakeholder analysis helps to gauge whose 
interest primarily affects the design, and whose interest is given a smaller level of 
consideration (Langford 2012, 260). Within the context of the principles of OSA, all 
stakeholder influence on a system must be considered. If a stakeholder’s influence is not 
accounted for, then the system may not be as adaptable or changeable. This thesis study 
analyzes stakeholders according to, but not limited to, the following: current interest, 
future interest (changes in policy), objectives, motives, and values (Langford 2012).  
An LCU USV system potentially has hundreds of stakeholders, and it is beyond 
the scope of this report to analyze each individual according to the criteria. This thesis 
categorizes many of the potential stakeholders according to one area of commonality for 
each. The category is used here as the differentiator for analyzing the stakeholders. Many 
stakeholders fit into more than one category, further complicating the task of stakeholder 
analysis.  
The stakeholder analysis resulted in new relationships amongst program and 
system elements for consideration during the systems engineering process. The 
stakeholder analysis also resulted in the following: uncovered complexities, influences, 
multiple-use objectives, conflicting requirements, architecture alternatives, and new 
stakeholders (Langford 2012). 
After drafting an initial list of stakeholders and a few use-case scenarios, 
customer needs may be derived therefrom. Fulfilling the customer need, in this case, may 
take on a wide variety of materiel manifestations given the number of stakeholders that 
must be satisfied. There may also be non-materiel solutions that fulfill the customer need. 
As a result of the stakeholder analysis, the information exists with which to begin 
formulating the system functions. Identifying additional stakeholders and additional 
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customer needs is a continuous activity throughout the systems engineering process, and 
the potential solution always needs to account for this.  
In traditional systems engineering, the stakeholder needs are regarded as a tool to 
develop a novel solution to a set of requirements. However, in the case of asset 
repurposing and reuse, the stakeholder requirements must be used as a threshold for 
evaluating the base system for repurposing and reuse. Thus, this thesis does not search for 
a particular, original solution to satisfy the stakeholder needs and requirements. It does, 
rather, assess the suitability of one particular solution, the LCU USV, for use in satisfying 
as many of the customer needs as feasible.  
F. OSA CONSIDERATIONS FOR STAKEHOLDER IDENTIFICATION AND 
ANALYSIS.   
OSA considerations must be implemented to properly account for the varying 
interests of system stakeholders and their influences on long-term program supportability 
and viability. This mandates that the system incorporate appropriate considerations for 
“reconfigurability, portability, maintainability, technology insertion, vendor 
independence, reusability, scalability, interoperability, upgradeability, and long-term 
supportability” (U.S. DOD OSA Data Rights Team 2013). First, the program must 
“ensure that external information exchange requirements are implemented in a standard 
and open manner” (U.S. DOD OSA Data Rights Team 2013). Second, the program shall 
ensure that it promotes the use of open standards at an architectural level, and then tailor 
the standards to meet specific Service and Joint requirements (U.S. DOD OSA Data 
Rights Team 2013). See Chapter III, Table 5 through Table 8, for a list of considerations 
that aid in applying these OSA principles.     
G. TOP-LEVEL USE CASES/CONOPS 
USVs in the current marketplace perform a clearly defined set of missions. For 
the LCU USV, this uses, as a basis, a mission taxonomy developed by OPNAV N81 and 
RAND Corp (see Figure 17). There are currently 16 distinct types of missions, and  
63 USVs in the marketplace (RAND 2013).  
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Figure 17.  USV mission taxonomy in the current marketplace  
(from RAND 2013). 
This thesis uses as a starting point for LCU USV concept-of-operations analysis 
those missions that are considered highly suitable (RAND 2013). These missions are also 
those that have been verified as desirable by LCU and USV program stakeholders. A 
highly suitable mission in one that has the following characteristics (RAND 2013): 
1. Increases effectiveness significantly 
2. Addresses capability gaps  
3. Reduces risks, costs, need for capital assets, time lines  
4. Is more appropriate than alternative unmanned or manned platforms  
5. Provides acceptable transportation, hosting, and support requirements  
6. Has programmatic compatibility  
In order to explain how missions in this analysis were chosen, this analysis must 
first establish a convention for classifying missions. There are three levels of 
technological development for USV missions (RAND 2013): 
In or near market:  Greater than, or equal to Technology Readiness Level 8 
(TRL 8) 
Emerging: TRL 4 to TRL 7 
Incipient:  Less than of equal to TRL 3 
 
See Appendix B for an explanation of Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs). 
 60
The LCU USV expands the scope of the traditional USV mission set to include 
several other top-level mission sets. It does this by increasing the suitability and 
technological development level of certain missions as defined by RAND 2013. Missions 
that were previously defined as emerging or incipient (i.e., less than TRL 8) may now be 
considered closer to market (i.e., TRL 8) because of the utilization of the LCU USV for 
that particular mission. For example, the RAND (2013) study classifies the autonomous 
ship-to-shore connector mission as incipient (i.e., less than or equal to TRL 3). The 
implementation of an LCU USV for execution of this mission may make that mission 
more technologically ready for implementation.  
Generally, the LCU USV can be used to perform command, control, 
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR); 
mine warfare; and functional support activities. Performance of an in-depth CONOPS 
analysis can further reveal and explain potential LCU USV missions.  
H. DETAILED USE-CASES AND CONOPS  
The intended physical operating environments for USVs are in and around 
harbors, strategically placed within major shipping routes such as the Strait of Hormuz, 
or possibly out in the open ocean (DOD 2013). In all environments, the USV must meet 
operational requirements that are both common and uncommon to traditional maritime 
operations. In the absence of onboard, manned intervention, the USV must be able to 
navigate waypoints, staying within designated waterway lanes, and avoiding obstacles in 
the maritime environment. The USV system must also ensure that its payloads are 
deployed, operated, and recovered without onboard, manned intervention. Furthermore, 
USVs must operate in compliance with the maritime statutory and regulatory mandates of 
its operational environment. 
Because of the open architecture nature of the LCU platform, the number of 
potential missions is quite broad. This analysis highlights only the most effective 
missions in terms of suitability, technology readiness, and customer needs.  
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1. Functional Missions 
Functional missions are those that lie outside the scope of combat operations, 
often representing those that are in support of larger, or more complex operations. These 
missions include, but are not limited to, test mission support, operational training support, 
search and rescue, hosting and support of other unmanned vehicles, heavy-lift cargo 
transportation, and acting as an information-signal relay station. 
a. Test Platform 
The LCU USV is a suitable platform for testing support missions. Manned vessels 
are usually utilized in support of operational research, development, test and evaluation 
missions. However, large ships are often in high demand, and not available to support 
such missions. The LCU USV can suitably fulfill this mission.  
The CONOPS for test support missions involves executing several actions. The 
LCU USV is first be loaded with a payload of test equipment, on the shore or on a 
mothership, prior to deployment. A crew of expert personnel ensures that the equipment 
and required operations were installed, tested, and verified before deployment. The 
personnel also preprograms the LCU USV and test equipment payload to the desired 
level of autonomy. If a low level of autonomy is chosen, then the LCU USV can be 
controlled from a station aboard a mothership or on the shore. Once deployed, the 
platform transits via waypoints under autonomous direction or under the control of a 
remote operator. According to the mission need, the testing can be conducted while 
underway, when the vessel has arrived on station, or both. Any data collected during this 
mission can be wirelessly transmitted back to station or stored onboard until the end of 
the evolution. After the test support mission is completed, the vessel transits back to the 
shore or the mothership for recovery, data retrieval, maintenance and preparation for the 
next mission. Such flexibility can be especially useful for battle group predeployment 
workups and evaluations at sea. 
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b. Training support 
USVs can support all levels of training for the U.S. Navy and Marines from unit-
level to joint force interoperability training. The LCU USV can be used in simulated 
attacks, visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) evolutions, and piracy training missions. 
Sensor packages that can be installed on USVs to assist training include active/passive 
acoustics, passive/active radar augmentation, flares, electro-optical/infrared cameras, full-
motion video, and strobe lights (to simulate firing) (RAND 2013).  
Manned LCU vessels have traditionally been used in training exercises. Adding 
the unmanned capability to the existing CONOPS for LCU training support missions 
increases the value of the LCU platform to the Naval community.  
The CONOPS for training support missions involves executing several actions. 
The LCU USV is first be loaded with a payload of training support equipment, on the 
shore or on a mothership, prior to deployment. A crew of expert personnel ensures that 
the equipment and required operations were installed, tested, and verified before 
deployment. The personnel also preprograms the LCU USV and training equipment 
payload to the desired level of autonomy. If a low level of autonomy is chosen, then the 
LCU USV can be controlled from a station aboard a mothership or on the shore. Once 
deployed, the platform transits via waypoints under autonomous direction, or under the 
control of a remote operator. According to the mission need, a remote operator operates 
and controls onboard equipment. After the training support mission is completed, the 
vessel transits back to the shore or the mothership for recovery, maintenance and 
preparation for the next mission.  
c. Search and Rescue of Conscious Victims 
This analysis discusses several instances of a manned LCU or a USV being used 
in humanitarian assistance/disaster recovery (HA/DR) in Chapter I. Adding USV 
capabilities to the LCU allows for execution of a broader HA/DR mission set. USVs have 
been used in several instances in the recent past to conduct search and rescue, and save 
lives in civilian contexts. One prominent rescue USV is the Emergency Integrated 
Lifesaving Lanyard (EMILY) (RAND 2013).  
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The CONOPS for SAR missions involves executing several actions. The LCU 
USV might first be loaded with a payload of search and rescue equipment, on the shore 
or on a mothership, prior to deployment. Such payloads include fixed sensors, signal 
devices, sensors, lifesaving flotation equipment, and towed arrays amongst other assets. 
A crew of expert personnel ensures that the equipment and required operations were 
installed, tested, and verified before deployment. The personnel also preprograms the 
LCU USV and SAR payload to the required level of autonomy. If a low level of 
autonomy is required, then the LCU USV can be controlled from a station aboard a 
mothership or on the shore. Once deployed, the platform might transit via waypoints 
under autonomous direction, or under the control of a remote operator. According to the 
missions need, a remote operator can optionally operate and control onboard equipment 
according to the SAR mission needs. Because SAR is a dynamic evolution with many 
changing variables, the vessel and payload needs to respond to track changes, condition 
changes, and course alterations. Additionally, SAR missions may need to accommodate a 
human life onboard the LCU USV if a conscious victim is found and recovered aboard 
the USV. In this case, a sailor is the best person to operate the USV in the traditional 
manner if the operational risk-level allows. After the SAR mission is completed, the 
vessel transits back to the shore or the mothership for recovery, maintenance and 
preparation for the next mission.  
d. Unmanned Vehicle Support 
The LCU USV system is a suitable platform to serve as a barge-like, 
untraditional, alternative host vessel for other unmanned vehicles (e.g., UUVs, USVs, 
and UAVs). The motivation for examining this alternative is that the LCU USV has a 
high likelihood of being a low cost, high capacity, rugged complement to the existing 
UUV host vessels and UUV missions. The LCU USV can facilitate the integration and 
operation of networks of other unmanned vehicles. Unmanned vehicle networks or 
swarms can leverage the LCU USV’s large payload capacity, long endurance, and large 
power supplies.  
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Both in practice, operational environments, academia, and popular culture, 
unmanned vehicles (i.e., drones) have been gaining more attention and use. In order to 
support this increase in the use of unmanned systems for various applications, more 
innovative means of supporting these systems need to be employed. Highlighting this 
need, the Department of Defense says, “An organic support infrastructure for 
configuration control, supply support, maintenance, storage, and transportation is 
essential to bring efficiencies and cost effectiveness to these critically important systems” 
(DOD 2013). It is essential that the hosted high-value unmanned systems have options in 
terms of effective system sustainment.  
This analysis does not focus on any particular missions or unmanned vehicle set, 
but rather focuses on the ability of the LCU USV to host, deploy, retrieve/recover, 
recharge, and conduct data transfer with the hosted unmanned vehicle (UXV). 
Notionally, the LCU USV craft carries varying payloads of UXVs (see Figure 18). 
Ideally, the LCU USV capability also includes deployment and recovery of the 
unmanned vehicles, and recharging and data transfer from the UUVs.  
 
Figure 18.  Schematic of notional LCU USV carrying payload of varying unmanned 
vehicles, plan view. Deck space might also accommodate custom 
launch and recovery equipment. 
The CONOPS for unmanned systems support missions involves executing several 
actions. The LCU USV is loaded out with a pre-determined mission set of unmanned 
vehicles, likely unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), or unmanned surface vehicles 
(USVs). The LCU USV departs from the pier or well deck following a pre-programmed 
route to the area of responsibility (AOR). Once at the AOR, the LCU conducts launch 
and recovery (L&R) of unmanned vehicles. According to the missions need, a remote 
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operator might also operate and control onboard equipment. Alternatively, the unmanned 
systems payload can be preprogrammed to different levels of autonomous operation. It is 
worth noting that some UXV payloads are disposable, and not designed to be recovered. 
If required by the mission, the LCU USV can recover the payload, or else leave the 
payload on station. If recovered, the UXV payload is subsequently recharged, repaired, 
and undergoes data transfer. After the UXV support mission is completed, the LCU USV 
vessel can transit back to the shore or the mothership for recovery, maintenance and 
preparation for the next mission.  
e. Payload Delivery, Autonomous Ship-to-Shore, or Shore-to-Shore 
Connector Payload Delivery 
With the increase in innovative product development, additive manufacturing, and 
advanced technology, the Navy needs more platforms and more options for delivering the 
necessary parts, supplies, and systems to the AOR. The LCU USV is a suitable platform 
to carry prepackaged payloads (e.g., conex boxes, white box trucks, pallets, and shipping 
containers) of inexpensive, but necessary supplies (see Figure 19). For example, the LCU 
USV might carry much-needed water pallets to troops on an unrefined beach, or else 
might carry containers of raw material for additive manufacturing (e.g., 3D printed spares 
for miniature quad rotors and other UAVs). Such a raw-material payload has a low risk 
level, and allows for disposability if the payload becomes jeopardized or compromised.  
 
Figure 19.  LCU Carrying payload of three (3) white-box delivery trucks  
(from Workboats International 2014). 
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The concept of employment for payload delivery and autonomous ship-to-shore 
movement is as follows: The LCU USV is loaded out at the pier or well-deck with a pre-
determined payload of cargo (e.g., 3-D printed materials, machines, and spares) and 
supporting logistics equipment. The LCU USV departs from the pier or well-deck 
following a pre-programmed route to the delivery area. Once at the delivery point, the 
LCU is unloaded autonomously via crane or forklift, or manually by a crew of personnel. 
After the mission is completed, the LCU USV vessel transits back to the shore or the 
mothership for recovery, maintenance and preparation for the next mission.   
The LCU USV is also extremely valuable without a payload onboard. It is worth 
noting that the LCU USV, itself, might be the payload, acting as a choke point or a 
harbor/riverine defense barrier unit.  
f. Information Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (PED) 
The LCU has a mast, a large cargo-deck area, and below-deck volume that may 
be used for hosting communications and signal-relay systems. Thus, the LCU USV can 
be suitable for information and signal processing, exploitation, and dissemination. 
In this CONOPS, the LCU USV transits autonomously via waypoints to an area 
of responsibility loaded out with C4ISR equipment for the desired mission. Alternatively, 
the LCU USV might conduct this mission from pier-side or else a beached shore location. 
The LCU USV can act as an information processing and intermediary decision point for 
command and control of downstream mission needs. After the mission is completed, if 
required, the LCU USV vessel transits back to the shore or the mothership for recovery, 
maintenance and preparation for the next mission. 
2. C4ISR Missions 
There are a number of CONOPS and platforms with which the Navy conducts 
operations for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, and 
Reconnaissance (C4ISR). There exist several manned and unmanned platforms for such 
missions. In popular culture, the UAV has gained notoriety for its ability to perform in 
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this type of mission. The USV is a critical asset that proves a high value to these 
missions, and it needs to be considered for increased utility as such.  
a. Persistent ISR in Permissive Environments 
The LCU USV platform provides and low-risk means to accomplish persistent 
ISR missions. Typically, this type of mission is executed using and manned platform that 
hosts or tows sensor systems to gather data about threats in the surrounding environment. 
The LCU USV and associated sensors can detect, intercept, and collect images of marine 
structures, images of adversarial operations, shipping-lane obstructions, harbor debris, 
geographical information, topographical measurements, electromagnetic signature 
information, radio signals, and other various data. This is not only valuable in Naval 
missions, but also possibly even more valuable to routine port security operations.  
The CONOPS for Persistent ISR missions involves executing several actions. The 
LCU USV is first loaded with a payload of ISR equipment and sensor packages, on the 
shore or on a mothership, prior to deployment. This includes towed sensors, fixed 
sensors, and signal devices amongst other assets. A crew of expert personnel ensures that 
the equipment and required operations were installed, tested, and verified before 
deployment. The personnel also preprogram the LCU USV and ISR payload to the 
required level of autonomy. If a low level of autonomy is required, then the LCU USV 
may be controlled from a station aboard a mothership or on the shore. Once deployed, the 
platform transits via waypoints under autonomous direction, or under the control of a 
remote operator. According to the missions need, a remote operator operates and controls 
onboard and towed equipment. The vessel and payload can then carry out the required 
combination of signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), and 
measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) operations. After the ISR mission is 
completed, the vessel transits back to the shore or the mothership for recovery, 
maintenance and preparation for the next mission.  
b. Environmental Collection in Permissive Environments 
The environmental collection mission is very similar to that of the C4ISR 
mission. However, it is worthy of mention as its own entity because it highlights the 
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utility of the LCU USV in a civilian, commercial or military weather application 
scenario. These missions typically happen outside of a theatre of military operation, 
within the context of routine data collection.  
The CONOPS for environmental collection missions involves executing several 
actions. The LCU USV is first be loaded with a payload of environmental measurement 
equipment and sensor packages, on the shore or on a mothership, prior to deployment. 
This includes towed sensors, fixed sensors, and signal devices amongst other assets. A 
crew of expert personnel ensures that the equipment and required operations were 
installed, tested, and verified before deployment. The personnel also preprograms the 
LCU USV and sensor payload to the required level of autonomy. If a low level of 
autonomy is required, then the LCU USV may be controlled from a station aboard a 
mothership or on the shore. Once deployed, the platform is able to transit via waypoints 
under autonomous direction, or under the control of a remote operator. According to the 
missions need, a remote operator can control onboard, towed, and nearby equipment. The 
vessel and payload can then carry out the required combination of weather 
measurements, bathometric surveys, and other types of hydrological analysis (RAND 
2013). After the ISR mission is completed, the vessel is free to transit back to the shore or 
the mothership for recovery, maintenance and preparation for the next mission.  
3. Mine Warfare Missions 
There are a number of mine warfare missions for which the LCU USV is suitable. 
Mine proofing and MCM intelligence preparation of the battle space (IPB) missions are 
examined in this section. MCM requisition, mine neutralization, mechanical 
minesweeping, influence minesweeping, and mine harvesting are other missions that may 
prove somewhat suitable for the LCU USV.  
a. Minefield Proofing 
Because of the rugged nature of the LCU USV and the inherent dispensability as a 
vessel from which the Navy has already drawn its intended service-life value, the LCU 
USV is a suitable craft for minefield proofing operations. It is highly capable of surviving 
mine blasts, and may be made more survivable by filling the steel hull with buoyant 
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materials (e.g., Styrofoam, or heavy-duty air bags). The as-built steel mono-hull design, 
draft, acoustic signature, and magnetic signature make the LCU USV an outstanding 
candidate for minefield proofing missions. “If desired, the USV’s draft and signatures 
could be enhanced by attachments (e.g., a large rake to increase effective draft, wire coils 
to increase magnetic signature, a very loud speaker system)” (RAND 2013). 
The CONOPS for Minefield Proofing missions involves executing several 
actions. If required, the LCU USV is first be loaded with a payload of sensor packages, 
on the shore or on a mothership, prior to deployment. The void below decks also needs to 
be filled with buoyant material. A crew of expert personnel can ensure that the equipment 
and materials were installed, tested, and verified before deployment. The personnel can 
also preprogram the LCU USV to the required level of autonomy. If a low level of 
autonomy is required, then the LCU USV may be remotely controlled from a station 
aboard a mothership or on the shore. Once deployed, the platform can transit via 
waypoints under autonomous direction, or under the indirect control of a remote operator. 
The vessel might sustain damage from exploded ordinance, if encountered. After the 
minefield-proofing mission is completed, the vessel can then transit back to the shore or 
the mothership for recovery, maintenance and preparation for the next mission.  
b. MCM Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace  
The MCM Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace( IPB) mission is similar to 
that of the C4ISR mission. However, the MCM IPB mission focuses specifically, and 
directly on identifying new threats via sonar contacts. These missions are typically 
carried out during peacetime. This allows new threats (e.g., new mine types) to be better 
identified and countered during times of conflict.  
The CONOPS for Minefield Proofing missions involves executing several 





on a mothership, prior to deployment. A crew of expert personnel ensures that the 
equipment and materials are installed, tested, and verified before deployment. The 
personnel can also preprogram the LCU USV to the required level of autonomy. If a low 
level of autonomy is required, then the LCU USV may be remotely controlled from a 
station aboard a mothership or on the shore. Once deployed, the platform can transit via 
waypoints under autonomous direction, or under the control of a remote operator. The 
towed sonar array gathers intelligence information, and stores it for later recovery or send 
it back to a host wirelessly. After the MCM IPB mission is completed, the vessel can 
transit back to the shore or the mothership for recovery, maintenance and preparation for 
the next mission.  
I. STATEMENT OF CUSTOMER NEEDS 
The discussion of OSA SE methodology in Chapter III gave insight into the basic 
principles that satisfy the customer need from a business and technical perspective. At 
this point, this analysis further refines those principles and needs into systems and 
engineering functions that can be input into the engineering design process.  
After completing the stakeholder analysis, the current and future interests of the 
stakeholder provide insights into previously unrealized needs. For example, the 
stakeholder analysis revealed that basic security of the cargo and the craft is a customer 
need. At this point, this analysis remains open to all use-case scenarios. Remaining open 
to all highly suitable missions ensures that any emergent customer needs are considered. 
Customer needs are developed based on review of the literature, notional missions, 
speaking with subject matter experts, market research, the principles of OSA, and 
experiential knowledge of the subject. Table 15 presents implicit, basic customer needs. 
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Table 15.   Initial, top-level customer needs for the LCU USV. 
The expectation is that these needs may change over time as additional 
information surfaces that has not yet been considered. After establishing the customer 
needs, it is the duty of the systems engineer to derive requirements that in turn produce a 
system that meets these customer needs. 
J. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS (WITH METRICS) 
After establishing top-level customer needs, system requirements may be derived 
by quantifying and bounding the customer needs with metrics. In identifying systems 
requirements, this analysis considers customer needs in conjunction with the salient 
factors (e.g., assumptions, independent variables, dependent variables, measures, and 
measurement) (Langford 2012, 259).  
Requirements definition is especially challenging within an open systems 
architecture (OSA) context because the architect must be careful not to assume a 
particular physical solution to the problem too early in the system engineering process. 
Therefore, the requirements and corresponding metrics must be defined loosely enough to 
allow for future, changing missions.  
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The requirements and metrics for the LCU USV are largely determined by the 
base characteristics of the LCU craft (see Chapter IV, Section B.4). Those metrics that 
remain likely change with respect to craft operation are those requirements that alter the 
craft for autonomous navigation and control, autonomous payload operation, and those 
metrics which were originally limited by the presence of human personnel onboard (i.e., 
mission duration limitations because of food provisions). Note that some requirements 
can be quantified numerically, while others are measured with a “yes” or “no” answer. 
Table 16. presents the initial LCU USV requirements.  
 
Table 16.   Initial LCU USV system requirements. 
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In DOD and U.S. Navy systems, after establishing requirements from discussion 
with the stakeholders, those requirements must be traced back to high-level policy 
documents, instructions, directives, or other official guidance. In flexible, modular 
architecture, requirements must be defined in such a way that they allow room for future 
accommodation of unknown missions and modules. Further discussion of requirements 
traceability to requirements documents, instructions, and directives is presented later in 
this analysis.  
K. OSA CONSIDERATIONS FOR SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
In implementing OSA when determining program requirements, systems 
engineers and program managers must ensure that all system requirements (including 
those contained in an Initial Capabilities Document, Capabilities Development 
Document, Capabilities Production Document, and certain contract sections) are 
accounted for through a demonstrated ability to trace each requirement to one or more 
modules that consist of components that are self-contained elements with well-defined, 
open and published interfaces implemented using open standards (U.S. DOD OSA Data 
Rights Team 2013). See Chapter III, Table 5 through Table 8, for a list of considerations 
that aid in applying these OSA principles.     
L. SYSTEM BOUNDARIES  
Concurrently with the consideration of system requirements this analysis also 
derived and identified additional, broad design constraints and assumptions that bound 
the system design. Understanding the constraints and assumptions often directly 
influence the development of requirements and functional decomposition. This analysis is 
careful to be sensitive to the possibility of implicit constraints. While there can be a small 





When considering natural/environmental constraints, assumptions must be made 
regarding local maritime traffic patterns. When considering physical constraints, 
assumptions must be made regarding acoustic signatures, magnetic signatures, craft size, 
craft profile physical limits, noise limits and visual limits (i.e., lights). When considering 
operational constraints, assumptions must be made regarding Navy standard operating 
procedures, Naval Vessel Rules, safety, force structure, manpower, physical security, 
surveillance systems/cameras, and operational security. When considering political 
constraints, assumptions must be made regarding the ability of officials to limit program 
funding. Finally, when considering C4I constraints, assumptions must be made regarding 
signals, bandwidth, info assurance/info security (IA/IS), signal jamming, sending and 
receiving classified signals, and data encryption.  
M. STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE LCU USV 
This sections presents both the structural and functional decomposition of the 
LCU USV. 
1. Structural Decomposition 
The structural/object decomposition associated with the LCU USV is closely tied 
to the Ship Work Breakdown Structure (SWBS). The LCU USV SWBS in this analysis 
was derived by combining elements of the Heavy Lift Army Landing Craft (HLALC) 
SWBS (Carderock (NSWC0-CD) 2010) with a general NAVSEA SWBS (Hills 2012). 
Table 17 is a representation of the SWBS showing mainly those elements of the craft that 




Table 17.   LCU USV structural decomposition via SWBS (after 





2. Functional Decomposition  
Although this study examines mainly the most suitable missions, many of the 
functions overlap for the postulated missions. Thus, this study does not analyze the 
functions for each of the missions, but rather performs an overarching functional analysis 
that covers the scope of the potential mission set. This functional decomposition is 
partially adapted from the Required Operational Capabilities And Projected Operational 
Environment For Navy Expeditionary Intelligence Command Forces (OPNAV N85 
2010) and from NPS-SE-11–006 Capstone Project/Thesis (Calvert 2011). See Table 18. 
Note that functions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 may also be represented as subordinate functions to 
each of functions “4.X.” However, it is presented in this manner to facilitate 




Table 18.   LCU USV 2-level functional decomposition (after OPNAV 
N85 2010, Calvert 2011). 
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N. INTERFACE MANAGEMENT 
The interface definition step in system architecture is an iterative process that 
identifies the details and standards for the key interfaces. It builds on the results of the 
previous steps and repeats them when needed. Key interfaces must be defined 
functionally and physically. These steps are particularly important for OSA design. 
After establishing the requirements, system components, and functions, the 
systems engineer must then be concerned with how to join the boundaries seamlessly 
between system elements. The interfaces between system elements must be defined and 
managed before the process of system architecting and design begins. System failures are 
most likely to occur when energy, matter, material, or information must cross a boundary 
within a system (see Chapter IV, section B.1). “Failures often occur at the interfaces 
between system elements, in many cases, between interfaces thought to be separate” 
(DOD 2011). 
Open standards must be utilized when considering interfaces within a system. 
“Interface standards specify the physical, functional, and operational relationships 
between the various elements, hardware and software, to permit interchangeability, 
interconnection, compatibility and/or communication, and improve logistics support” 
(DOD, 2004). 
With respect to the LCU USV, it is of particular importance to focus on those 
interfaces that are altered from human-machine interface to a robotically controlled, 
unmanned interface. The utilization of open architectures (OA) is necessary to overcome 
problems associated with proprietary robotic system architectures (DOD 2011). 
Furthermore, open interface specification helps to achieve “modularity, commonality, 
and interchangeability across payloads, control systems, video/audio interfaces, data, and 
communication links” (DOD 2011). This openness can also lead to lower life cycle costs, 
and more capability for the end user.  
The primary human to machine interfaces (HMI) in the traditional LCU system 
are the navigation systems, craft steering and control systems, machinery monitoring and 
control systems, safety and alarm systems, radio and communications systems, damage 
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control systems, climate control systems, cargo and payload mechanical handing and 
stowage systems, anchor and ramp systems. In converting the LCU into a USV, all of 
these systems need to be designated as requiring complete autonomy, partial autonomy, 
or sufficient risk mitigation. This means that the human-to-machine interface associated 
with each one of these systems may need to be reengineered to be electronic and 
controlled by software command in such a way that OA and open interfaces are included.  
Research has shown that there are not many standards, instructions, or handbooks 
that establish requirements for open architecture solutions to common, major naval 
systems. The following are open standards that have been published that may guide the 
systems engineering effort for primary interfaces (see Tables 19 and 20). Further 
experience by other OSA programs may offer additional insights. 
 
Table 19.   Open interface standards for LCU USV navigation systems. 
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Table 20.   Open interface standards for LCU USV systems. 
There are other key interfaces external to the system including that of the overall 
craft interface with the shore structure. If the current LCU craft remains in service as the 
LCU USV, then the shore infrastructure must be considered. The Navy currently has 
plans to replace the current fleet with no accompanying plan for building a new shore 
infrastructure needed to accommodate and support the new fleet. Therefore, the old fleet 
assets (i.e., the LCU USV) may eventually need to be hosted elsewhere. This requirement 
and other external interface aspects are addressed in more detail in the Intersystem 
Interfaces and Business Case Analysis (BCA) sections of this thesis.  
O. OSA CONSIDERATIONS FOR INTERFACE DESIGN AND 
MANAGEMENT 
In managing the interface design and maintenance throughout the system 
development, the program manager and systems engineer must account for several 
considerations. First, all of the interfaces must be defined clearly using open standards. 
Second, the program must be sure to “define and document all subsystem interfaces, and 
configurations to provide full functional, logical, and physical specifications” (U.S. DOD 
 81
OSA Data Rights Team 2013). Finally, the program shall identify processes for 
“specifying the lowest level at below which it intends to control and define interfaces by 
proprietary and or vendor-unique standards and the impact of the upon its proposed 
logistics approach” (U.S. DOD OSA Data Rights Team 2013). These interfaces shall 
include subsystems, hardware, software, mechanical, and electrical amongst others. See 
Chapter III, Table 5 through Table 8, for a list of considerations that aid in applying these 
OSA principles.     
P. SUBSYSTEM INTEGRATION 
The key to achieving OSA principles in subsystem integration requires 
designation of functional component areas, establishment of an open architecture design 
with zones and stations, and identification and definition of key interfacesat the sub-
system level (Marcantonio 2007). Upon completion of the functional analysis, different 
LCU USV subsystems can be divided into their common components. Components that 
perform a similar function (e.g., craft control) are grouped into the same functional 
component areas.  
Following the establishment of architecture stations and zones, it is important to 
define the potential interfaces. In DOD practice, this is usually done via an interface 
control document (ICD), initial capabilities document, and/or capabilities development 
document (CDD) (Marcantonio 2007). 
There are no existing reference documents that specifically define LCU USV 
interfaces. Nevertheless, criteria must be established for identifying key interfaces. This 
study uses the same criteria as Marcantonio in establishing the LCU USV key interfaces. 
The criteria are as follows (Marcantonio 2007): 
 
1. Where the technology for the system components is evolving 
2. Where the system components have high usage rates and are often replaced 
 
Key system interfaces information is best presented, controlled and managed via 
detailed installation drawings, and technical specifications that define key interfaces for 
specific installations. Using this approach, this study derives a LCU USV reference 
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model to help better understand the key interfaces (see Figure 20).  In Figure 20, the 
solid, two-headed arrows represent physical, wired connections between modules, 
systems, or zones.  The dashed lines in Figure 20 represent the sea frame.  It is important 
to note that key to the implementation of OSA in subsystem integration is considering the 
connections between all subsystems within the overall LCU USV, both below and above 
deck. 
 
Figure 20.  LCU USV functional component areas (after Marcantonio 2007). 
The functional component areas identified for the LCU USV are the above deck 
equipment, local control, remote control and auxiliary equipment. Component areas may 
contain multiple components, but all support a common function. In general, components 
and equipment are grouped according to physical characteristics and functional 
characteristics.  
The LCU USV incorporates internal functional arrangement practices that support 
changing the capabilities of the craft. The model designates each of the spaces adjacent to 
the module spaces to support equipment for their respective modules and includes 
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installation of FlexTech architecture, which allows the supporting equipment to be 
installed in a modular, open, nature as well (DeVries, Levine and Mish Jr 2010). Further, 
the model allocates the space volume adjacent to the modules for other equipment 
associated with the module (Page 2011). 
Dividing the system into functional areas helps accommodate variable physical 
geometries, flexibility, and open systems design. This type of modularity breaks down 
the LCU USV into functional elements that are common to multiple systems, such as 
weather deck components, below deck components, and remote components. 
Q. OSA CONSIDERATIONS FOR SUBSYSTEM INTEGRATION 
When implementing OSA principles in subsystem integration of a system, the 
systems engineer and program manager must consider both module coupling and module 
cohesion. OSA mandates the use of loosely coupled modules that have “minimal 
dependencies on other modules as evidenced by simple, well-defined interfaces and by 
the absence of implicit sharing of data and intellectual property” (U.S. DOD OSA Data 
Rights Team 2013). Changes to one module shall not necessitate significant changes to 
another module or zone.  
Modules shall be integrated with a high level of cohesion. Highly cohesive 
modules are characterized by the “singular assignment of identifiable and discrete 
functionality” (U.S. DOD OSA Data Rights Team 2013). “The purpose is to ensure that 
any changes to system behavioral requirements can be accomplished by changing a 
minimum number of modules within a system. In determining the level of both module 
coupling and cohesion, the approach used to determine design and flexibility tradeoffs 
shall be clearly described. See Chapter III, Table 5 through Table 8, for a list of 




R. INTERSYSTEM INTEGRATION 
After establishing the top-level system requirements, and interfaces, the attention 
of the system engineering process is turned towards ensuring that all of the new systems, 
those related to the autonomous operation and missions, are well integrated with all other 
LCU systems, and with external systems. At this point, the systems engineering focus is 
on ensuring the integrations of various system elements into a final system configuration. 
“Such elements include not only mission-related hardware and software but also people, 
real estate and facilities, data/information, consumables, and the materials and resources 
necessary for the operation and sustaining support of the system throughout its planned 
life cycle” (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 132). See Figure 21 for an example 
operational view of the LCU USV intersystem integration. Figure 21 shows the 
operational connection between the LCU USV, air vehicles, shore establishments, 
warfighters, control systems, data systems, and underwater systems. 
There are a few areas of primary concern when integrating new subsystems with 
the remainder of the LCU systems, external systems, and the operating procedures. For 
the LCU USV a few key concerns for intersystem integration are the interface of the 
vessel with its host (e.g., well deck, shore establishment, pier, or port) and the interface 
between the various payloads and the vessel (e.g., “conex” box and cargo deck, or UUV 
launch system and LCU machinery controls). 
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Figure 21.  Operational view of LCU USV intersystem integration  
(after DOD 2011). 
1. LCU USV Berthing Interface 
All naval vessels must be stowed in a secure, monitored space while the vessel is 
not in operation in the open water. Some refer to this place as the “home port” of the 
vessel. The current fleet of 32 LCU are home-ported at Assault Craft Unit (ACU) 1 in 
San Diego, CA; ACU 2 in Norfolk, VA; and a small number are Forward Deployed 
Naval Forces (FDNF) with detachment West Pacific (WESTPAC) to in Sasebo, Japan. 
The current Naval plan replaces the existing LCU fleet with exactly the same number of 
Surface Connector (X) vessels (i.e., LCU replacements) berthed at the existing LCU 
Shore establishment ACUs. This means that the future LCU USV likely needs to be 
berthed elsewhere. There are many assumptions, requirements, and considerations that go 
into determining where the LCU USV is berthed when not in service.  
While operational, the LCU USV is likely to be hosted inside the well decks of 
the amphibious big-deck ships of an ARG/MEU, ESG, or Battle Group. Of course, this 
assumes that there is space available in a well deck, and that the operational 
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commander’s mission calls for the use of an LCU USV. The LCU USV can also be 
hosted at a pier almost anywhere in the world. LCU USVs can also be beached. From a 
river in Europe, to a remote island in the South China Sea, there are many options for 
berthing the LCU USV when not operational, and not hosted in a well deck of a ship. 
Thus, berthing requirements are likely not to hinder program success.   
2. LCU USV Logistics and Consumables Interface 
How the system interfaces with other important systems necessary for its 
operation is important. Some of these include consumables, repair/maintenance items, 
and the people who have to perform these duties.  
The LCU USV has the option of operating in either a manned or unmanned state. 
Currently, the LCU receives resupply of consumables like food, water, maintenance 
provisions and fuel while in home port or in the well deck. The LCU USV is able to 
receive such consumables in the same manner as the current LCU fleet.  
Routine maintenance personnel, materials and tools used for maintenance tasks 
sill need to interface with the LCU. The interface requirements for these items thus also 
need to be determined. Many of the interface requirements are expected to be the same as 
for the existing LCU whereas the type of maintenance, logistical footprint, and physical 
maintenance space requirements are not expected to change from the current LCU.  
3. LCU USV Payloads Interface 
There are a wide variety of payloads that may be hosted by any given LCU USV 
vessel. The unique attributes of each specific payload dictates that the detail design 
requirements of the interface between the payload and the LCU USV vessel must remain 
flexible. For instance, a simple static “conex” box payload interface may be 
accommodated sufficiently by the existing pad-eye tie down structure on the existing 
cargo deck. A payload of autonomously operated UUVs may also require the addition of 
a cradling system, as well as a launch and recovery mechanism in order to meet interface 
requirements.  
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S. OSA CONSIDERATIONS FOR INTER-SYSTEM INTEGRATION 
OSA must be implemented in intersystem integration with the objective of 
minimizing intersystem dependencies. The systems engineering approach shall result in a 
layered system design, maximizing independence between systems components, 
hardware, and software (U.S. DOD OSA Data Rights Team 2013). The system shall be 
able to survive a change to the internal and external infrastructure with minimal to no 
changes required to the core functionality. Data defining the interfaces must be made 
available to the program throughout the lifecycle of the system. Data accessibility can 
promote the decoupling of components and component reuse. See Chapter III, Table 5 
through Table 8, for a list of considerations that aid in applying these OSA principles.   
T. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
“It is the job of the architect to pose the brilliant solution” (Langford, 2012, 275). 
A good architect poses a solution that is within objectives, resources, limitations, 
stakeholder sensitivities, constraints, budget, schedule, rules, policy, skills, etc. 
Architecture is what the system does and how it does it (Langford 2012, 276). Systems 
architecture includes both system conceptualization and system visualization.  
1. Conceptualization  
Conceptualization is the beginning of the systems architecting phase where there 
is still much uncertainty as to how the technical requirements and metrics requirements 
might manifest in the final system. Conceptualization involves integrating system 
requirements into a single concept. It requires that the concept make sense in written 
form before the architect begins forming that concept in to a visual, physical form (i.e., 
Visualization). At this point, the systems engineer has used notionally selected 
operational scenarios to help think through the customer needs, requirements, and 
perform a stakeholder analysis.  
User needs and requirements are conceptualized by answering the following 




Table 21.   Sample question to guide system conceptualization  
(from Langford 2012, 271) 
In the case of the LCU USV it is important to conceptualize first how the craft 
needs to be rearchitected as an optionally unmanned vessel. Next, it is important to 
conceptualize how the vessel needs to be rearchitected in order to meet one or more of 
the various new missions that may need to be accomplished.  
As a starting point for conceptualization, this analysis refers back to the four 
definitions of autonomy derived earlier in this analysis (see Chapter I, Section G). With 
increasing levels of autonomy comes an increased cost to the Navy. Additionally, 
increased levels of autonomy also require less bandwidth from communications assets 
(i.e., lower wireless signal requirements). Therefore, it is best to conceptualize a craft that 
is a combination of Remote Controlled Operation and Semi-Autonomy. Flexibility makes 
sense because most unmanned systems are a combination of levels of autonomy and thus 
cannot be clearly bounded by any one definition of autonomy.  
One assumption is that the LCU USV has little value to the Navy unless personnel 
can be totally removed. Therefore, building the craft with autopilot-type autonomy is not 
of interest in this analysis. While manning might be reduced because of the elimination of 
a navigator and/or helmsman, risks associated with manning are present because of the 
personnel onboard for other reasons such as payload operation and deployment.  
a. LCU USV System Concept, Iteration 1 
The first iteration of design consists simply of reconfigured craft navigation and 
machinery control systems to include optional, remote-controlled, or preprogrammed 
semi-autonomous navigation and propulsion. This gives the option of removing 
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personnel from the vessel if there is no requirement for manned payload 
operation/deployment while the vessel is underway (i.e., not in port/well-deck). There are 
no autonomous mission packages, but in turn mission systems and static payload can be 
preloaded at a pier or well deck according to need. The missions are limited to that 
possible with a traditional, non-reconfigured LCU (see Table 22).  
 
 
Table 22.   LCU USV design concept features, Iteration 1. 
While matching LCU capabilities, this design iteration nevertheless limits  
the ability to conduct some missions typical of a USV. Thus, the next design/ 
conceptualization iteration needs to address that issue more sufficiently. However, 
increasing vessel capability also increases cost, and so care needs to be taken not to add 
cost-prohibitive capability.  
b. LCU USV System Concept, Iteration 2 
This design iteration has the same features as iteration 1 except that added 
capability can enable remote-controlled payload operation (i.e., towing, launch and 
recovery, charging, data transfer). This assumes that manned interaction with the payload 
is still able to happen at both the end and the beginning of an overall mission evolution 
(i.e., at the pier or in the well deck). This also gives an additional option of removing 
personnel from the vessel if there is no requirement for manned payload 





Table 23.   LCU USV design concept features, Iteration 2. 
c. LCU USV System Concept, Iteration 3 
This design iteration is the same as Iteration #2 except that it also provides the 
additional capability for totally autonomous, preprogrammed payload operation (i.e., not 
remote controlled) (see Table 24). 
 
 
Table 24.   LCU USV Design Concept Features, Iteration 3. 
Concept formulation is complete when the builder thinks that the system can be 
built to the client’s satisfaction (Maier and Rechtin 2009, 400). At this point, this thesis 
analysis concludes design iteration and revisits the requirements in order to make 
decisions as to what requirements can be met, and which requirements may not be able to 
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be met with this design. At this point, it is easiest to heuristically “down select” to one 
preferred concept to pursue based on the expected level of autonomy.  
Design iteration #2 is chosen because of its ability to meet many more mission 
requirements of a traditional USV while not being as costly as Design iteration #3. With 
continued conceptualization and design iterations, the systems engineer must begin to 
consider tradeoffs between overall user needs, design requirements, cost, and design 
feasibility. Design Iteration 3 remains viable as a future upgrade option since Design 
Iteration 2 is a non-conflicting subset of capabilities. 
2. Visualization  
 “Design is the capture of what you want to do (i.e., idea) in physical, 
functional, and process thinking. Visualizing the idea through sketches, 
imagery, photos, or drawings conveys design. The appearance of the idea 
is expressed and refined until the views of the design capture your 
physical, functional, and process thinking. Once the outward appearance is 
firmed up, the physical, functional, and process thinking is conveyed 
through diagrams of how things will work, what will happen if, and what 
the design means to someone else. (Langford, 2013, 8 March E-mail to 
Author/M. Smith)” 
a. Autonomous Operation of the LCU USV Controls 
The LCU, as traditionally operated, has several manned systems/interfaces. Our 
chosen design maintains these manned interfaces. Sailors primarily interface with the 
LCU when controlling craft at the helm console, the navigation station, the conning 
station, and the cargo deck (see Figure 22).  
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Figure 22.  Block diagram of existing LCU 1610 class controls. 
The simplest required change for the LCU craft to become an optionally 
unmanned vessel is the change to the design of the control mechanisms for navigation, 
and steering and machinery monitoring systems. In order to satisfy the requirements of 
our chosen design, this analysis also has to address engineering a system for the 
unmanned control of the cargo deck controls such as the anchor, the ramps, and necessary 
control of the payload. Development of unmanned controls for the payload is beyond the 
scope of this thesis analysis (see Figure 23).  
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Figure 23.  Block diagram of existing manned controls with addition of  
unmanned control systems indicated by dashed lines. 
The key focus of the engineering for the unmanned systems of the LCU USV is 
replacing the human logic and decision-making ability with a computer-controlled logic 
capability. For this purpose, this design concept includes a programmable logic controller 
(PLC). This logic controller/system can allow for preprogrammed navigation and 
propulsion, or remote controlled navigation and propulsion, and/or remote controlled 
payload operation/ mission accomplishment. See Appendix D for details and explanation 
of notional system elements, companies, and other stakeholders that contribute to the 
conversion of the LCU to the LCU USV for unmanned control and operation. 
Further development of the engineering for the unmanned controls is reserved for 
further study. Keeping with OSA principles, the engineering of the unmanned controls 
might mandate the use of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components for the PLC and 
other components of the unmanned system. Identifying and integrating these components 
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requires close monitoring of industry capabilities in order to get requirements that are 
executable and competitive over the full system lifecycle in accordance with OSA 
principles. 
b. Autonomous Area-of-Operation Awareness 
A number of sensor systems need to be integrated into the outside of the structure 
of the LCU USV for sensory data collection. A number of cameras also need to be 
installed for 360-degree operational visual awareness by remote operators. Sensors 
arealso be needed for other human-like senses such as sound and vibration. Pictured in 
Figure 24 is the sensor suite for the Control Architecture for Robotic Agent Command 
and Sensing (CARACaS) autonomous control system. From bottom to top, the 
components are the stereo electroptic, 360-degree electro-optic, radar, and lidar 
(Brizzolara 2014). 
  
Figure 24.  Sensor suite for the Control Architecture for Robotic Agent Command 
and Sensing (CARACaS) (from Brizzolara 2014). 
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c. Autonomous Operation of LCU USV Payloads and Mission Execution 
The systems that are essential to the reengineering of the LCU USV for 
unmanned operation are mainly electronic, and mechanical systems that do not make the 
craft appear drastically different on the exterior. In other words, most of the systems are 
computer and machinery/mechanical changes that are implemented inside of the LCU 
hull. Nevertheless, in order to realize the true value of the LCU USV, it helps to visualize 
several of the reengineered craft configurations for unmanned operation of the various 
payloads.  
Figure 25 shows an LCU USV carrying a payload delivery mission in unmanned 
remote controlled mission mode. On the deck, there are conex boxes that were loaded by 
sailors in port or well deck for delivery to the mission area. The LCU USV conducts an 
unmanned transit and delivery with the crane offloading the boxes at the destination.  
 
 
Figure 25.  Modified image showing visualization of LCU USV with crane, 
carrying payload delivery mission of conex boxes (after 
FrenchConnections 2014 and Wikimedia Commons 2014). 
For unmanned ISR, MCM, testing, unmanned vehicle support, and environmental 
collection, the craft needs the ability for fully autonomous payload operation, 
preprogrammed payload operation/mission accomplishment, or remote controlled 
payload operation/mission accomplishment. This can be accomplished via a towed 
sensor, an autonomous crane-like launch and recovery system, and/or a pulley-like, 
reeled line system. Figure 26 shows an LCU USV with a towed UUV payload system. 
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Figure 26.  Modified image showing visualization of LCU USV towing a SeaOtter 
II UUV payload (after Navsource 2014 and Military Technology 2014) 
Figure 27 shows a visualization of the LUC USV with a crane handling a UUV 
payload.  
 
Figure 27.  Modified image showing visualization of LCU USV with crane 
launching/recovering a UUV payload (after Tribune Broadcasting 2014 
and NavSource 2014). 
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Many other considerations must be planned when visualizing and engineering the 
system. For the LCU USV, these considerations are best saved for further work that may 
be completed as a part of a requirements-driven operational study on detailed design and 
construction of the LCU USV system.  
U. TESTING 
LCU USVs must adhere to the same requirements as any manned craft or boat. 
Any LCU USV craft test program must address both craft operation, craft system 
operation, craft safety and craft systems safety. “Testing unmanned systems, in general, is 
a significant challenge and can be very costly. For example, if it is impossible to put a 
man aboard a USV, the amount of time and expense increases significantly to verify that 
the propulsion system is working correctly” (DOD 2013). The Navy has developed a 
guide for testing USVs and drafted an approach to certifying USVs. This and other USV 
test guidance documents are listed in Table 25. Testing is typically more effective when 
performed as early in the design process as possible.  Virtual testing using modeling and 
simulation has further benefits. 
 
 
Table 25.   USV test guidance references.  
Once constructed, the LCU USV must undergo test and evaluation to ensure 
validation of requirements, and verification of operation. Manned testing is the safest, 
most reliable manner of initial testing for USVs. Because the LCU USV can 
accommodate personnel onboard, the crew can ensure proper operation and evaluation of 
systems and subsystem performance. This may be considered developmental testing. 
Once the LCU USV is ready for full operational test and evaluation, the craft may be 
operated at the chosen level of autonomy on a dedicated test range. It may be noted that 
some craft are too small (jet-ski-sized craft, for example) to accommodate onboard test 
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personnel and thus require all operation to be performed remotely or autonomously 
(Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division, Detachment Norfolk (NSWC-CD-
DN) 2012). This is not the case with the LCU USV.  
Testing and evaluation is the stage of the systems engineering process where the 
open architecture standards used in system design are evaluated for compliance. Figure 
28 shows the notional challenges of testing the LCU USV for U.S. Coast Guard Collision 
Regulations (COLREG) compliance. In this test scenario, a traffic vessel is crossing from 
the right. The unmanned surface vessel (USV) autonomously maneuvers around the 
traffic vessel in compliance with the collision regulations. The colors around the USV 
indicate in velocity space: safe velocity vectors (green), potential collisions (red) and 
violations of collision regulations (purple). The white circle in front of the USV is the 
desired velocity vector and the blue line is the actual velocity vector (Brizzolara 2014). 
  
Figure 28.  Notional USV challenges when testing for compliance with COLREGS. 
(after Brizzolara 2014). 
The systems engineering process must certify conformance of the LCU USV 
system. The program needs to prepare validation and verification mechanisms such as 
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conformance certification and test plans to ensure that the system and its component 
modules conform to the external and internal open interfaces. Proper test, verification, 
and validation are also necessary to minimize risk to acquisition and operation of the 
LCU USV. Verification is conducted to ensure that selected work products meet their 
specified requirements (DAU 2014). Validation is conducted to demonstrate that a 
product or product component fulfills its intended use when placed in its intended 
environment (DAU 2014).  
Normally, a USV system design can be verified, at least in-part, by using the 
system reference model, combined with preliminary market research to compare 
the system with existing systems. Since there are no existing USVs of comparable 
size and capability to the LCU USV, this method is not likely to be feasible. 
The LCU USV system might follow a similar standard for the USV verification 
and validation process as in current U.S. Navy USV development. First, the LCU USV 
software and systems can be simulated in a lab environment. Next, the mechanical and 
electrical systems (which are mostly legacy components) are tested pierside. Finally, all 
systems are run in a controlled water environment (Naval Surface Warfare Center, 
Carderock Division, Detachment Norfolk (NSWC-CD-DN) 2012). A detailed review of 
the reference models compared to the chosen LCU USV system and subsystem 
technologies, and compared to the LCU USV functional models allow further 
verification that of each of the LCU USV subsystems conformed appropriately to 
the desired technical architecture.  
Validation occurs when the LCU USV is put into initial operational use, and the 
warfighter is given a shakedown period in which to evaluate the performance of the 
vessel versus the needs in the area of operation.  
V. IMPLEMENTATION 
After the system is built to the satisfaction of the systems engineer and the 
stakeholders, the process of preparing it for use in operational circumstances must begin. 
Implementation includes initial operational capability execution, and reiteration of many 
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of the previous steps of the process model based on subsequent operational feedback. 
This period is often referred to as post shakedown availability.  
Implementation also includes operator training, deployment planning, 
maintenance considerations, life cycle management, and logistics planning. Some of 
these issues are addressed further in the Business Case Analysis chapter.  
W. TRANSITION 
The systems engineering process must be concerned with the LCU USV system 
all the way though the full transition of this system into initial operation capability (IOC) 
with the Navy Fleet. The timing, location(s), and pace of delivery are just a few factors 
that must be planned by the systems engineering process when deciding how to introduce 
the system to the Navy fleet. This includes making sure that all aspects of program life 
cycle are fully addressed outside of the purview of the engineering team that brought the 
system to fruition.  
Although the systems engineer maintains some sort of reach-back policy with the 
fleet and program managers, they are able to be less involved with system and program 
development at this point. At this point, resource sponsors, program managers, 
acquisition managers, in-service engineering agents, and the fleet begin to maintain the 
program of record. Some of these issues are addressed further in the Business Case 
Analysis chapter.  
X. DISPOSAL LIFE CYCLE 
Navy assets must first be stricken from the Naval Vessel Register before 
they can be disposed. Once stricken, their disposition can occur via several 
methods: scrapping, transfer to the U.S. Maritime Administration 
(MARAD), foreign transfer, experimental/target, donation, historic 
memorial, transfer to other government/non-government agencies or navy 
sale. (Navy League of the United States 2014) 
LCU are not listed as part of the Naval Vessel Register and so there is more 
flexibility with respect to disposal options. Many traditional LCUs, and similar craft have 
been located for sale on the open, commercial market in recent years. This becomes a 
likely method of disposal for deactivated LCU USVs. Other disposal options such as test 
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targeting, and scrapping are also viable. Some of these issues are addressed further in the 
Business Case Analysis chapter.  
Interestingly, since LCUs are available to foreign military partners, the LCU USV 
becomes adaptable and holds interest for a wide variety of partnered efforts and vessels o 
opportunity that are maintained by international Naval partners. 
Y. SUMMARY 
This chapter demonstrated the application of OSA principles to systems 
engineering methodology as a management approach for converting a Landing Craft 
Utility (LCU) to an Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV). The approaches hold broad 
generality for the adaptation of other manned Naval vessels into the fleet-compatible 
unmanned systems.  It guided the reader through the SE process of converting an LCU to 
a USV while asking and answering applicable OSA questions.  This process began by 
identifying stakeholders, and top-level system requirements.  Next, this data was used to 
develop operational concepts, and system constraints.  OSA principles were considered 
and implemented throughout these steps. Subsequently, this chapter considered how to 
manage system integration efforts by combining SE with OSA.  After this, the design of 
the LCU USV was conceptualized from the data derived.  After choosing a final design, 
testing, implementation, and lifecycle considerations were examined, again by combining 
OSA with SE.  After conduction a thorough SE analysis using OSA, a foundation is set 














V. BUSINESS CASE ANALYSIS 
This chapter presents a business case analysis (BCA) regarding the LCU USV. In 
the specific case of system repurposing and reuse, it must be beneficial to the system 
owner to continue system operation instead of system disposal. In order to accept the 
feasibility of fielding the LCU USV, the U.S. Navy must decide that such conversion is 
worth the return on investment. There are several decisions that go into making this 
approach a reality. These include the decisions not to dispose of the LCU right now 
although the craft are well beyond the intended service life. First, a decision must be 
made to maintain the current hulls in an operational state. Second, a decision must be 
made to install alterations that convert the LCU hull into a USV. Finally, operating an 
LCU as a USV is likely to require the decision to add additional payload operations so 
that payloads can be operated remotely or autonomously.  
A. CASE FOR KEEPING THE LCU BASE PLATFORMS  
In order for the U.S. Navy to consider keeping the LCU active for conversion to 
the LCU USV, a case must be made that there is value to be gained greater than the value 
that might be gained from another, more traditional method of vessel disposal. 
Traditionally, a craft of this type can be disposed of by selling it as scrap metal, putting it 
up for resale on the open market, or transferring it to another country.  
1. Scrap  
The LCU has a lightship displacement (i.e., weight), of 203 tons (200 LT). Thus, 
the LCU can garner approximately $95,000 given the current price of steel of 
approximately $470 per ton (London Metal Exchange 2014). More detailed calculation of 
the scrap value of the craft, and the cost of scrapping the craft is beyond the scope of this 
analysis, and needs to be reserved for separate analysis.  
2. Sell on Open Market 
Landing Craft Utility (LCU) are not listed on the Naval Vessel Register, so they 
are not limited to traditional Naval disposal limitations or processes. In fact, after 
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individual craft in the LCU fleet reach the end of their service life, and are deactivated 
from Naval operations, they are sometimes found listed for sale on the open, commercial 
market.  
According to one website, in 2006 a landing craft utility was put on sale in the 
open market for $350,000 (Philippine Defense Forum. 2014). More detailed calculation 
of the resale value of the craft, and the cost of resale of the craft is beyond the scope of 
this analysis, and needs to be reserved for separate analysis.  
3. Foreign Transfer 
Many foreign navies have landing craft similar to that of the LCU 1610 Class. 
The U.S. Navy takes measures to support U.S. Foreign Policy by transferring eligible 
ships to the navies of allied and friendly nations. Figure 29 shows the high number of 
activities around the world with interests in boat and craft acquisition. With the 
increasing importance of littoral, costal, and shallow-water humanitarian operations, the 
option to transfer the LCU 1610 class to a foreign Navy needs to be considered by the 
Navy. While there is no financial gain to be realized with this option, there is significant, 
measurable political benefit to the United States by choosing this option. More detailed 
calculation of the cost to transfer the craft is beyond the scope of this analysis, and need 
to be reserved for separate analysis.  
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Figure 29.  NAVSEA international craft/boat cases (from  NAVSEA 2013).  
4. Other Disposal Options 
There are several other options for disposal of the LCU. The Navy sometimes 
chooses to dispose of its assets by using them for targeting or test-firing platforms. 
Additionally, the Navy can chose to sink a ship for use as an artificial reef. Yet another 
option is to donate the ship to an organization within the United States for use a historical 
museum or other display function. While all of these options are somewhat viable for 
disposal of the LCU, their value to the Navy does not deem them competitive to the 
option of converting an LCU into a USV.  
Scrapping, open market sale, and transfer are all viable options for the LCU. 
However, a case may be made that the use of the principles of unmanned systems, open 
architecture and flexibility presented in previous chapters show that more useful life can 
be garnered from the LCU once converted to a USV. 
Converting the LCU to a USV and subsequently getting several more years of 
service life out of the craft does not reduce the viability of the traditional disposal 
options. Once the service life of the LCU USV is complete, it can still undergo one of the 
traditional disposal methods bringing yet another opportunity for additional value to the 
Navy.  
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Disposal is estimated to cost approximately $1.4M per hull (Windhalm 
2011). Disposal costs were based upon structural material and the labor cost for 
salvage (Windhalm 2011). Therefore, it may cost the Navy more money than they 
get in return to dispose of the craft.  
B. OPTIONS FOR EXTENDING THE LIFE OF THE EXISTING LCU HULL 
The fleet of LCU is 40+ years old on average. Any system of that age has its own 
unique maintenance and modernization issues that must be addressed to keep the system 
relevant and viable. Before the hull can be considered for conversion to a USV, the issues 
of craft maintenance needs to be addressed to extend the useful life of the hull. The LCU 
program has been undergoing maintenance and modernization for much of its service 
life. Upkeep of the craft has traditionally been accomplished via routine overhauls, 
maintenance availabilities, and modernization upgrades. At several times throughout the 
service life of the LCU, the idea of a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) has been 
considered, but never executed. Routine maintenance and SLEP are the two options that 
need to be considered most suitable for keeping the hull form (i.e., the shell/base of the 
LCU USV system) fully operational. The option to add the USV capability to the craft 
without conducting maintenance is not ideal, but is worth examination as an additional 
option. Additionally, it needs to be noted that the LCU craft can be mothballed or laid up 
until the Navy choses an option for extending the life of the hull.   
1. Routine Maintenance  
The vessels in the LCU fleet are more than 40 years old, and they are highly 
maintenance intensive. All craft in the fleet have experienced some level of neglect in 
maintenance, delay or cancellation of much needed repairs. With no formal maintenance 
program for a large part of its service life, the craft also underwent years of ad hoc 
maintenance as performed by sailors according to priorities set by individual Assault 
Craft Unit (ACU) Commanding Officers. The extent of these maintenance efforts is often 
limited to that which can be afforded by the allocated DOD budget. The maintenance is 
often limited to addressing the critical safety, hull, mechanical, and electrical repairs 
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needed to keep the craft operational until the next maintenance period. Craft generally 
undergo maintenance periods approximately every four years. An LCU maintenance 
availability for a single craft costs the Navy anywhere from $200K to $1M, depending on 
the needed scope of work, and the available funding. That represents a cost range of 
$50K to $250K per year, per craft, or an overall average of $150K per year, per craft.   
2. LCU Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) 
The longer the LCU USV craft stays operationally viable in the fleet, notionally, 
the more value that can be reaped from the asset. Keeping the craft viable for more than a 
few years may require a greater effort and investment than the traditional, routine 
maintenance program. To determine the specifics of the modification needed to keep the 
craft operational for five or more years, a number of in-depth design and engineering 
studies must be performed. Modifications proposed by these studies can then be applied 
to the craft as part of a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP). The addition of 
unmanned systems capabilities can be completed in conjunction with the SLEP or 
subsequent to the SLEP.  
The maintenance-intensive systems on the craft include the anchor windlass 
system, steering Hydraulic Power Units (HPUs), corroded bow ramp, bow ramp winch 
assembly, main engines and generators, corroded skegs and inaccessible voids, poor 
ventilation in manned spaces, high-heat conditions in magazines and accessible voids, 
shafts, propellers, and fire protection systems (Program Executive Office Ships (PEO 
Ships) 2012). It is likely that a SLEP program might best address most of these systems 
by replacing or repairing them with the least expensive, technically acceptable, 
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) system.  
In 2002, the costs for a SLEP program were determined to be $3.2 million in non-
recurring engineering design and planning costs, and $5.4 million per craft in labor and 
materials. Assuming that the craft can get ten (10) years of additional life, this equates to 
a cost of approximately $550K per year, per craft for the 32 craft in the fleet. These costs 
estimates change from year to year due to the changing material condition of the craft, 
and also the ongoing maintenance and modernization programs for the current LCU fleet 
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(CNA 2002). A more thorough, current estimate of a SLEP program is beyond the scope 
of this thesis, and needs to be performed as part of a separate study.  
3. Newly Constructed LCU Hullform 
The LCU is recognized as an essential workhorse for the amphibious fleet. As 
such, efforts to replace the craft over the years have received significant, broad support. 
The current LCU replacement program, called Surface Connector (X) Recapitalization 
(SC(X)R), has received tremendous support, and is slated for initial procurement funding 
in FY2017 for a craft with the same capabilities as the current LCU (Program Executive 
Office Ships (PEO Ships) 2012). Although the cost, and exact design of this system have 
not yet been determined, it may be feasible to consider utilizing the new-build design for 
LCU as the platform for the LCU USV. 
Leveraging the SC(X)(R) program for the LCU USV can still accomplish the 
notion of strategic reuse or repurposing. In many ways, leveraging the acquisition 
program for SC(X)R has the potential to save on acquisition costs for the LCU USV. 
These savings might be realized from leveraging many of the same craft design 
requirements, acquisition documentation, logistics plans, and non-recurring engineering 
plans.  
The benefit to this approach are expected to be that the LCU USV might be built 
on the framework of a new, modernized design that can result in increased craft lifespan 
and lower maintenance requirements. Additionally, if the LCU USV is fielded in 
conjunction or in close proximity to the SC(X)R, the Navy’s knowledge of how to 
efficiently build such a system can be optimized from a variety of lessons-learned and 
reduced learning curves.  
As seen in the “Related Work” chapter, many commercial companies and industry 
partners are using small, commercialized designs to derive new concepts for a large-
payload USV. This does not have to be the case. The current LCU is a military craft with 
many commercial-like design qualities. If industry were to utilize the exiting LCU or 
SC(X)(R) as a starting point for the detailed design of a USV, then that approach can 
 109
allow this concept to come to fruition much more efficiently. Significant cost savings are 
possible when price/performance is compared to commercial replacements.  
4. LCU with No Additional Maintenance (i.e., Do Nothing) 
The LCU vessels have been going for 40+ years with only routine maintenance. 
As with any system, the LCU requires this maintenance to continue operations. Without 
routine maintenance, it is difficult to predict how long each vessel can continue safe 
operation. If the Navy decides to no longer fund LCU maintenance and other life-cycle 
necessities (e.g., logistics and in-service engineering support), the craft is no longer able 
to continue safe operation. Notionally, a third party might take ownership of the LCU for 
continued operation in some form. Additionally, a research agency may realize value in 
taking ownership of an LCU and converting it to a USV to conduct research on large-
scale USVs. However, it is likely not viable to add the USV capability to the LCU unless 
there is at least minimal support for a continued maintenance of the fleet.  
C. CONVERSION COSTS 
There are several conversion costs for the LCU USV. These costs include non-
recurring engineering (NRE) expenditures as well as material and labor costs. Table 26 
shows a rough-order-of-magnitude estimate for the conversion cost going from the 
existing LCU to the LCU USV.  
 
Table 26.   LCU USV conversion costs. 
Appendix D provides a detailed explanation of these costs.  
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D. TOTAL OWNERSHIP COSTS (TOC) OF LCU USV OPERATION 
Beyond the costs to convert the LCU into a USV, the total costs of ownership of 
the LCU USV throughout its entire lifecycle must also be considered. These costs include 
several factors such as operations, support, logistics, infrastructure, and training costs. 
1. Life-Cycle Costs of the LCU 
For the discussion of life cycle costs, this analysis focuses mainly on the operation 
and sustainment (O&S) phase of the life cycle of the LCU. The O&S costs are separated 
into three categories: crew sustainment costs, maintenance costs, and the cost of 
consumables and technical support. O&S costs do not factor in the procurement and 
disposal phases of the life cycle. It costs the Navy $1.2 (in FY02 dollars) to operate and 
support the LCU (CNA 2002). This study utilizes this number as a basis for estimating 
the operations and support cost of the LCU USV. It costs $946K to sustain an LCU crew 
for one year, $276K to perform maintenance on one LCU in a year, and $50K to supply 
one craft with consumables such as fuel and spare parts. Table 27 shows the annual O&S 
costs per LCU 1610 vessel.  
 
 
Table 27.   O&S Costs of an LCU 1610 class vessel in FY02 $K  
(from CNA 2002). 
It is starkly apparent that crew costs compose nearly 75% of the O&S costs (CNA 
2002). Undoubtedly, the manning costs are an area of focus for costs reductions when 
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converting an LCU to a USV. This is also an important consideration when comparing 
alterations such as manned commercial craft. 
2. Logistics Impact 
Fifty-thousand dollars (4%) of the O&S cost is for consumables and technical 
support. Logistics are an important part of any Naval program, and they must be planned 
at the beginning of a program. Since the LCU were originally designed as a self-
sustaining craft, there is space on the craft to store spares and consumables. Alternatively, 
the consumables and spares can be stored on a host mother ship (see Figure 30).  
 
Figure 30.  A landing craft repair ship, USS Askari circa 1967 (from NHHC 2014). 
Logistics has been a major consideration since before the inception of the LCU 
1610 class program. Many of the existing LCU logistics considerations can be duplicated 
for the LCU USV since the craft have the same physical footprint. Operational 
differences account for variation in the type and quantity of spare parts. The particular 
logistics requirements depends upon the exact LCU USV subsystems, configuration, 
mission requirements, availability of resupply stations, and the proximity of LCU USV 
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operation to logistics basing. LCU USVs can be hosted on a mother ship or pierside at a 
shore establishment, both of which offer varying degrees of available logistics support. 
Beaching ashore is another option. In the Vietnam area, when a requirement arose to 
implement a surge in riverine boat forces, the Navy chose to reactivate many retired 
amphibious ships as hosts for riverine forces. These ships provided mobile berthing, 
supply, maintenance, repair and gunfire support to the riverine boat forces (CNA 2006). 
Likewise, large-deck amphibious Navy ships might support the LCU USV as flexible, 
moveable platforms.  
3. Infrastructure/Docking Facility Impact 
The Current fleet of 32 LCU are home-ported at Assault Craft Unit (ACU) 1 in 
San Diego, CA; ACU 2 in Norfolk, VA; and a small number are Forward Deployed 
Naval Forces (FDNF) with detachment West Pacific (WESTPAC) to in Sasebo, Japan. If 
the current LCU were allowed to remain at these shore establishments after being 
converted to LCU USV, then potential changes to the shore infrastructure need to be 
considered. The shore infrastructure must be refurbished for extended service life, and 
altered to accommodate USV berthing, operation, and logistical support. However, the 
Navy currently has plans to replace the current fleet of LCU with no plan of building a 
new shore infrastructure to accommodate and support the new fleet. Therefore, the 
repurposed, old fleet assets (i.e., the LCU USV) likely need to be berthed elsewhere. A 
cost effectiveness study for shore infrastructure options ought to be performed as part of a 
future study. 
4. Impact to Force Structure 
Assuming that the planned LCU replacement craft (i.e., the Surface Connector 
(X)) requires the berthing at all of the existing ACU shore establishments, it follows that 
they require the same, current space footprint in the well-decks of the amphibious fleet. 
Therefore, the LCU USV poses a significant stress to the existing well-deck space and 
infrastructure if they attempt to operate on the same footprint.  
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Notionally, the LCU USV has unique and different mission sets, and therefore can 
operate from a varied array of bases. Host ships operating with LCU USV must have the 
ability to ballast for wet well operations. This may require that the platform secure flight 
operations and other topside or weatherdeck evolutions while conducting wet well 
operations. It is likely to be a slower, heavy-lift logistics or amphibious ship. Generally, 
launching and recovering an existing LCU from a ship requires two hours; 30 minutes to 
ballast down and receive the LCU, up to 60 minutes to load the LCU, and another 30 
minutes to debark the LCU and deballast (Schmitz 1996). The ships that can carry and 
host and LCU USV are strategic lift assets such as the Lighter Aboard Ship (LASH), Sea 
Barge Carrier (SEABEE), float-on/float-off (FLO/FLO, and lift-on/lift-off (LO/ LO) 
vessels may be required (CNA 2002). Figure 31 shows an example of a float-on float-off 
ship hosting traditional landing craft.  
 
Figure 31.  Motor Vessel (MV) American Cormorant float-on float-off ship hosting 
various landing craft. (after NavSource 2009, Global Security 2011).  
5. Training and In-Service Engineering  
Continued support and sustainment of both the crew and craft capabilities are 
essential. To keep the operators of the LCU USV current to the state-of-the-practice, they 
must undergo continuous training. To keep the craft operational, they must receive 
continuous engineering support. An in-service agent acting as the authority on technical 
and training issues of the fleet of LCU USVs can conduct both of these functions.  
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With the majority of existing LCU craft located in Norfolk/Little Creek, VA and 
San Diego, CA, the Navy has also built up the necessary training to support craft 
operations in those locations. Much of the training for crews of existing LCUs takes place 
at existing amphibious facilities at or near the ACUs.  
With a large quantity of LCU USVs being developed and fielded in the near 
future, attention must be given to effective system sustainment. An organic support 
infrastructure for configuration control, supply support, maintenance, storage, and 
transportation is essential to bring efficiencies and cost effectiveness to these critically 
important systems. An in-service engineering activity (ISEA) and planning yard (PY) 
needs to be established for the LCU USV. The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock 
Division at Joint Expeditionary Base in Little Creek (Norfolk), VA is the current ISEA 
and planning yard for the current LCU. They are also the in-service engineering expertise 
for unmanned surface vehicles. Having an established ISEA/PY for LCUs in close 
proximity to the subject matter experts for USVs naturally suggests that the same, 
existing groups can perform the same functions for the LCU USV. The exact costs to add 
additional billets, and manhours to the existing groups need to be determined through 
additional study. However, it may be assumed that this cost might be significantly less 
than building these capabilities without the foundation of an existing program.  
E. OSA CONSIDERATIONS FOR TOTAL OWNERSHIP COSTS AND 
LIFECYCLE MANAGEMENT OF OPEN SYSTEMS 
There are several OSA considerations to account for when considering the 
lifecycle of a system such as the LCU USV.  The system architecture shall provide for 
the use of existing commercial supporting infrastructure and COTS technologies for 
system components.  The system must be designed such that COTS and Non-
developmental items (NDI) are logistically supported through the systems lifecycle.  In 
implementing OSA for reduced lifecycle costs and total ownership costs, the program 
shall ensure the availability of commercial repair parts, repair services, facilities, and 
manpower, and verify that they are maintained and warrantied at sufficient levels for 
long-term support.   
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Reuse of preexisting program elements is also important to implementing OSA in 
a program such as the LCU USV.  The systems engineer and program manager shall 
ensure that the program reuses preexisting designs, materials, items, facilities, supporting 
assets or components.  The general objective of these efforts shall be to reap the greatest 
technical and cost benefits via the development of common system elements across 
various DOD or Service platforms and mission requirements (U.S. DOD OSA Data 
Rights Team 2013).  See Chapter III, Table 5 through Table 8, for a list of considerations 
that aid in applying these OSA principles.   
F. LCU USV COSTS SAVINGS 
There many potential areas for costs savings when taking an open systems 
architecture approach to converting an LCU to a USV. Two of the most significant major 
areas for costs savings in the craft conversion are manning costs, and fuel costs. This 
analysis shows that manning costs savings are significant, and a direct result of the craft 
conversion. This analysis shows that the cost savings for fuel is derived from the inherent 
fuel economy of the existing LCU platform when compared to similar existing high-
speed landing craft, and the high speed requirements of existing USVs.  
1. Manning Costs Savings  
Manning is the predominant cost driver for DOD and Naval missions and 
systems. This is typically no different for unmanned systems. A significant amount of 
manpower is spent on directing mission planning, replanning, data collection, data 
analysis, mission projection, and creating actionable intelligence from the raw data (DOD 
2013). Because unmanned systems must match, and sometimes overmatch, the cognitive 
ability of their manned counterparts, the costs for the additional sensor and computing 
technology, and high levels of operator manning can be extensive and prohibitive. 
Therefore, of utmost importance for DOD is reduced manning in unmanned mission 
performance, and increased system and sensor automation. 
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One of the largest challenges in making the business case for developing 
unmanned systems is that unmanned equivalents for current DOD systems often require 
equal levels of manning as the existing manned counterparts. “Nearly all unmanned 
systems require active control of basic vehicle operations and behavior that affects 
communications, manpower, and system effectiveness” (DOD 2013). For example, a 
small RHIB for sensor deployment may require three personnel onboard to operate; a 
helmsman, a payload operator, and a mission commander. The remote operation of an 
equivalent USV requires at least the same number of personnel to be stationed inside of a 
remote command and control center. Thus, in this particular case, there are no savings on 
manning costs, and possibly increased manning costs due to the need to account for the 
increased monitoring of sensors for unmanned operation.  
A typical existing LCU crew consists of 11 personnel. The craft crew can surge to 
13 for wartime missions, and the craft has accommodations for 14 crewmembers. These 
numbers can vary depending on the mission requirements with the smallest crew being 8 
personnel (CNA 2002). Table 28 details current LCU crew billets. 
Crew costs compose approximately 75% of the operations and support costs for 
the existing LCU (CNA 2002). “As with other facets of unmanned systems, the need for 
greater autonomy is subject to fiscal pressures, (i.e., operating within budget constraints 
while reducing manpower needs and U.S. exposure to dangerous risks and increasing 
operational effectiveness” (DOD 2013). Thus, the business case for the LCU USV 




Table 28.   Historical LCU 1610 crew billets (from CNA 2002). 
The average cost for a crewmember was $86K in FY2002 dollars (see Table 29). 
In current year dollars (i.e., FY2014), the cost per crewmember can be conservatively 
estimated to be $125K per billet. Thus, for each crewmember eliminated from operational 





Table 29.   LCU Crew billets and costs (FY02 $K) (from CNA 2002) 
There are six main stations for the core LCU crew: conning (i.e., steering), 
engineering, deck operations, damage control, weapons, and a miscellaneous station 
(CNA 2002). There may be multiple billets assigned to each station depending on the 
needs of the mission. Notionally, for an LCU USV, one person is assigned to the 
monitoring and control of each one of these stations. Assuming that the LCU USV 
performs many of the same or similar missions as the existing LCU, this results in a 
reduction of five (5) billets, going from eleven (11) billets for the current manned craft to 
six (6) billets for the LCU USV. This equates to $625K in savings per craft per year in 
FY 2014 dollars. This is $20,000,000 saved per year in manning across the entire fleet of 
32 LCU USVs.  
2. FUEL COST SAVINGS 
By design, the LCU has inherent fuel efficiency. The traditional LCU has fuel 
capacity to travel at a sustained speed of 8 knots over a range 1200 nautical miles, 
without refueling. This is more fuel capacity, by volume, than existing USVs. Not only 
does this allow for sustained operations with durations comparable to smaller USVs, it 
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allows for the LCU USV to be able to complete missions using less fuel than comparable 
manned Naval assets.  
The LCU is more fuel efficient, in terms of total fuel cost versus throughput 
capacity, as compared to the higher, speed craft with similar CONOPS such as the 
Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC)/Ship to Shore Connector (SSC) (Chief of Naval 
Operations Assessments Directorate (OPNAV N81) 2011). LCU’s fuel usage is 
dramatically less than that of LCAC/SSC (see Figure 32). At lower distance The LCU 
uses approximately one-third of the fuel required by air-cushioned landing craft, and is 
even more efficient at higher speeds.  
 
Figure 32.  Fuel cost comparison for operation of a single LCU and air-cushioned 
landing craft (from OPNAV N81 2011). 
Though not meant as an indicator to replace the LCAC or SSC with LCU, this 
does provide further emphasis to the notion that for operations at the lower end of the 
ROMO, when cycle time is not a factor, the LCU is the craft of choice (Chief of Naval 
Operations Assessments Directorate (OPNAV N81) 2011). Furthermore, none of the 
potential missions for the LCU USV require high-speed maneuvers. Where speed is a 
requirement, a traditional high-speed USV suits the needed capability. For the LCU USV, 
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it is not cost effective to increase speed. Figure 33 shows that added speed above 
approximately 11 knots requires drastic increases in horsepower. Increased horsepower in 
turn mandates increased engine size, higher operational fuel costs, and lowered cargo 
capacity.  
 
Figure 33.  LCU Speed-power curve (at full-load displacement) (from CNA 2002). 
One might expect from this data that other USVs of similar size and capability 
might also become cost-prohibitive at higher speeds.  
G. DOD OVERALL BUDGET SUPPORT 
An independent study estimated the global landing craft market at $10.8 billion 
by the year 2019. The implications of this are tremendous for the country/organization 
that achieves and maintains the competitive advantage for such a heavy-lift, open 
architecture, unmanned landing craft technology (PRWEB 2014). Furthermore, “As 
unmanned systems have proven their worth on the battlefield, DOD has allocated an 
increasing percentage of its budget to developing and acquiring [unmanned] systems. 
With the transition from a handful of innovative experimental systems to normalized 
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program developments, unmanned systems have received their share of inclusion in 
Congressional direction and are influenced by many acquisition initiatives and 
departmental policies” (DOD 2013). While it is difficult to determine the exact return on 
investment (ROI) of an LCU USV system without further study and analysis, the 
potential to achieve gains from partnerships with other countries/navies, commercial 
industry, and academia are unprecedented.  
H. OTHER BUSINESS CONSIDERATIONS 
This section presents several additional key business considerations that must be 
considered when converting an LCU to a USV.  
1. Expanded Opportunities to Leverage this Concept 
The LCU USV reuse concept may be leveraged by multiple industries. These 
include the commercial maritime transport industry, law enforcement agencies, marine 
surveyors, weather surveyors, foreign cooperatives, oil platform patrols, and commercial 
scientific missions. If the Navy chooses not to convert all 32 LCU to USVs, the vessels 
can still be converted to low-level (i.e., remote-controlled) USVs and sold to other 
countries through foreign military sales. “Partnering with overseas military defense 
industries is also essential in the future, looking for those who build most effectively and 
efficiently” (Greenert 2014). Global Security operations in other countries for Security 
Force Assistance and Special Operating Force missions can all benefit from the utility of 
an LCU USV as a base for communications relays, training evolutions, explosive 
ordinance disposal support, and logistics support.  
2. Scalability 
There is a wide and varying array of landing craft. Appendix A shows a selection 
of these. The basic installation of systems for LCU USV operation can be installed on 
other types of landing craft with minor adjustments to the hardware and software. 
Furthermore, the size, mission configuration, and cost of the LCU USV are all scalable. 
The conversion system can range from simple to complex. In a new-construction setting, 
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the LCU USV design might be used to construct a smaller, simpler version of the craft, or 
a larger more complex system.  
3. Modular Production: Kitting 
Kitting is a method used by alteration installation teams for installation of 
modernizations and alterations on the existing LCU vessels. Just like payloads can be 
kitted in a modular fashion, installation of new systems can be planned as such. This 
concept ensures that requirements for parts, processes, and time, and supporting 
documentation for system installation are consistent across all installations. This method 
was recently used, for example, for the installation of a new steering and navigation 
system on the existing LCU craft in FDNF Sasebo, Japan. Likewise, the LCU USV 
systems can be kitted for installation on the wide and varying array of civilian and 
military platforms worldwide.  
4. Leadership Support and Key Strategic Enablers  
As of 2014, modernizing and replacing the existing LCU craft is a top priority of 
Naval and Marine amphibious forces. Extending that same notion, the LCU USV concept 
can expect to have considerable support from DOD leadership. The program deserves 
justifiable leadership support for each of the key enablers for flexible program structures 
(see Table 30).  
 
Table 30.   Key strategic enablers for flexible ship programs (from 
Program Executive Office Ships [PEO Ships] 2014).  
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5. Flexible Payload Acquisition Strategies (PEO Ships Flex Ships 
Roadmap) 
If the Navy decides to continue to use the existing 32 (or fewer) LCUs for LCU 
USV unmanned missions (or other missions), then the Navy must decide on the best 
strategy to maintain or modernize them for use in the new, varying missions areas. Each 
LCU USV can be configured for a particular, fixed mission. However, an analysis of 
alternatives for the LCU USV may reveal that it is better to construct a flexible, modular 
payload structure for varying missions. In either case, it requires a careful examination of 
the cost effectiveness for varying missions for the Navy.  
The LCU USV program might take advantage of several strategies for payload 
acquisition. These include “Just-in-time Payload Installation, After-Delivery Payload 
Installation, Modular Design and Construction, and Family of Ships/Shared Payloads” 
(Program Executive Office Ships (PEO Ships) 2014). The LCU USV is most likely to 
take advantage of a family of varying payloads that can be shared by the fleet of LCU 
USV. The Navy must be careful, however, to not add so much flexibility that the program 
expenses reach cost prohibitive levels.  
6. Flexible Craft Acquisition Strategies and Contracting Strategies  
Because the LCU USV is built on the foundation of an existing platform, the 
program does not have to undergo the full-scale procurement steps required by the DOD 
5000.01 Integrated Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Life cycle 
Management System. It is likely that the LCU USV requires a significant level of concept 
refinement and technology development. However, because the system reuses an existing 
hull, and adds proven technologies to it, it may be able to skip some of early requirements 
typical of a new program. If, for instance, a simple remote control autonomy was added 
to the craft, the LCU USV program may primarily forgo the Pre-Systems Acquisition 
phases and start in the early stages of System Acquisition (see Figure 34). Thus further 
savings are realized in comparison to a new-start program. 
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Figure 34.  LCU USV enters at the Systems Acquisition Phase of the DOD 5000.01 
systems acquisition model (after U.S. Department of the Army 2003). 
For simple addition of systems and sensors for basic automation and remote 
operation, the work might be considered a boat alteration. This boat alteration can be a 
collection of systems installed, via Alteration Installation Team, on the boats pier side. 
Although simple, there are several options for the Government to compete this work. A 
build-to-print approach can be taken in which the contractors compete for a construction 
contract to produce an exact government design. Alternatively, the government can 
competitively offer to share the design responsibilities with the contractor, still allowing 
them the full construction task. The last possibility is for the government to fully compete 
all design and construction efforts.  
The LCU USV program can also exercise flexibility in the contracting approach. 
The program might choose to execute under the traditional FAR15 negotiated contract 
approach for non-commercial Items. However, because the LCU USV may have 
similarities to commercial assets in the near future, and the system can contain extensive 
use of COTS subsystems, the program can also execute under the FAR 12 commercial 
item procurement approach.  
Different contracting and acquisition strategies yield different results with respect 
to program timelines for establishing full operational capability. Assuming that it takes 
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five years after the existing LCU replacement program receives construction funding, the 
first LCU USV vessel might finish construction in fiscal year 2022. See Table 31 for a 
notional LCU USV construction profile.  
 
Table 31.   LCU USV notional construction fielding profile by fiscal 
year.  
7. Incentives: Getting Industry On-Board with this Concept 
When engaging industry, flexibility must be created and maintained from the 
program conception. It is imperative that the OSA management strategy used in the LCU 
USV program includes provisions for incentives and/or award fees for the contracted 
industry stakeholders. Contractors must be incentivized to adopt the “reuse” approach to 
system acquisition versus the traditional “start over” approach. When the Government 
contracts work with industry, the program must be structured such that contractors are 
incentivized to deliver the best quality product or service to the Government at the best 
possible cost.  
For the LCU USV program this can be accomplished in a number of ways. 
Initially, the wide field of competitors in the marketplace is likely to incentivize 
contractors to develop a cost effective solution. Whether contracting an industry partner 
to install alterations via AIT, or contracting a shipyard to conduct full-scale LCU USV 
conversion program, incentives need to be built into the contract structure to produce 
continued savings. The contract ought to include cost plus incentive fee or fixed price 
incentive fee structures depending on the level of risk sharing between the contractor and 
the Government. These incentives can lead to improved supportability, improved 
interoperability, increased use of open systems, and optimization of unmanned system 
components.  
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Beyond contract structure, another huge incentive for industry is the ability to 
continue to profit from work originally performed under government contract. In order to 
incentivize industry, the government must create contractual provisions for contractors to 
use their intellectual property and data to profit in other markets. This must be 
accomplished without limiting the government’s ability to access the same data for future 
program development.  
8. Legal Considerations 
The legal considerations for the operation of unmanned systems are still in their 
infancy and are changing with time. Preparing for current and projected capabilities is a 
matter of updating the literature to reflect current operational concepts, threat projects, 
and technology improvements (CNA 2006). Doctrine, instructions and guidance for the 
operation of unmanned systems must be well maintained to the current legal 
environment. Maintaining this doctrine requires a continuous feedback loop from 
unmanned systems managers, developers, testers, and users.  
I. OVERARCHING OSA BUSINESS PRACTICES 
Implementing OSA in the business practices of the systems engineering process 
means ensuring that there are multiple sources capable of meeting the requirements at 
any given point in time.  In the case of a system such as the LCU USV, the modularity of 
the system design must promote the deification of multiple sources of design, supply, 
repair, and support. Furthermore, all of these sources must support flexible business 
strategies that enhance, not hinder, competition.  If appropriately implemented, OSA 
considerations sufficiently address a wide range of factors from system power and 
cooling design, to legal rights for intellectual property to quality assurance, to market 
acceptability, to total program cost.  See Chapter III, Table 5 through Table 8, for a list of 
considerations that aid in applying these OSA principles.   
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J. SAVINGS THROUGH SELECTION OF BUSINESS AND SYSTEMS 
ENGINEERING PROCESS MODELS 
Systems engineering is essential to realizing a product that meets the needs of the 
stakeholders. However, simply performing good systems engineering alone does not 
guarantee production of the desired product. The management approach to how you 
procure the system matters tremendously too. This is particularly important with the 
strategic reuse of an existing asset such as in the LCU USV program.  
DOD systems in general, and unmanned systems in particular are hardware, 
software, middleware, and data intensive. When working with industry, DOD must be 
sure to protect the software, data rights, and intellectual property developed with program 
funding. Standards such as ASTM F2541–06, “Functional Allocation of Major UUV 
Autonomy and Control Components” must be used to protect the data rights of the 
Government in working with industry to create an unmanned system. This standard 
details the functional allocation of major unmanned system (specifically UUV) autonomy 
and control components.  
The current state-of-the practice for unmanned systems in DOD details several 
areas for improvement with the current systems and engineering process models (see 
Table 32).  
 
Table 32.   Unfavorable characteristics of the current business and SE 
approach to DOD unmanned systems (from DOD 2011).  
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By applying the OSA principles from Chapter III (see Tables 5–8) with an 
existing SE model, this study shows that the LCU USV program sufficiently addresses 
the unfavorable characteristics of the current approach to USV acquisition (see Figure 
35).  
 
Figure 35.  OSA-based systems engineering management model for  
LCU USV development (after DoD 2014). 
K. SUMMARY 
The section presented a business case analysis (BCA) regarding the conversion of 
the LCU to the LCU USV. Central to the discussion of the business case were the 
considerations to keep the LCU craft, then extend the life of craft.  After these decisions 
were proved feasible and viable, the chapter then presented several areas for TOC and 
lifecycle cost savings when using OSA to convert the LCU to a USV. The chapter then 
presents and resolves several other business considerations including system and program 
scalability, industry incentives, leadership support, and legal issues. Finally, the chapter 
presents potential savings through the use of OSA business practices and process models.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
To help explain the value of reuse and repurposing, this thesis details a case study 
utilizing a Landing Craft Utility (LCU). The Landing Craft Utility (LCU), 1610 class, 
was built in the 1970s as an update of the landing craft made famous during the island-
hopping amphibious campaign of World War II. The LCU is 135 feet long and can carry 
180 tons of equipment or 400 combat equipped Marines at 12 Knots. These vessels are 
normally transported into theater in the well decks of L-Class amphibious ships; 
however, organic messing and berthing facilities for its crew of 13 (including 2 Officers) 
enable self-sustained at sea operations in excess of seven days.  
The LCU affords heavy-lift, endurance and independent operations when speed is 
not the driving requirement. The LCU remains a valuable and complementary platform in 
the context of expeditionary operations and surface logistics support of forces ashore. 
The current U.S Navy Landing Craft Utility (LCU) 1610 Class is planned for 
replacement between 2017–2023. Upon deactivation, conceivably, these assets can be 
repurposed as controllable USVs and used for many more years.  
This thesis demonstrated how the concepts of open systems architecture (OSA) 
must be applied within the context of an existing, traditional systems engineering 
methodology to result in the production of a flexible system that supports the Defense 
enterprise in maintaining the competitive advantage.  
This was accomplished by leveraging an existing systems engineering process 
model in conjunction with the use of the OSA management and business practices. 
Particularly, the OSA practices were illustrated by deriving several questions that must be 
appropriately answered in the effective implementation of the SE process.  
To prove utility of this systems engineering management approach, this thesis 
demonstrated an atypical asset-repurposing program. The Landing Craft Utility (LCU) 
was not intentionally, originally designed as a highly reusable truck with an inherent 
ability to be repurposed for future, yet-to-be-determined missions. However, this thesis 
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has proven, via converting an LCU to a USV, that there is value in design for reusability 
and repurposing of exiting assets.  
This thesis showed that OSA technical architecture is best implemented by 
defining high-level flexibility requirements. This not only leaves more trade space for the 
designers and engineers, but it also helps keep system costs low by loosely defining the 
interfaces. It also allows the system to be upgraded at a later time. Extending this notion, 
this thesis shows that proper up front architecting can balance non-recurring acquisition 
costs with future recurring life cycle and modernization costs.  
A reference model and open standards are used to show the value of interface 
flexibility. This study also showed that, when working with open systems, the systems 
engineering team can avoid major system changes, even if the system is already 
rigidly/maturely designed, by developing an open technical architecture within existing 
design constraints. By defining key interfaces, modules, stations, and zones, the impact of 
alterations might be less costly. This type of design methodology is especially effective 
for highly technical systems such as the LCU USV where technology advances may 
occur rapidly.  
Often, in traditional DOD acquisition programs, acquisition authorities choose the 
lowest cost, most technically acceptable choice from amongst feasible, new design 
alternatives. Strategic reuse or repurposing of assets represents a break from the 
traditional sense of new-product acquisition, new-construction, or product 
upgrade/modernization decisions. The idea of design for reusability is something that has 
been applied within software and computer science applications for some time, but it has 
not been a primary consideration in DOD systems engineering practices. In the case of 
the LCU USV, this analysis made the decision to continue the use of a Naval asset via 
repurposing it instead of traditionally disposing of the asset.  
A. RECOMMENDATIONS  
Future work may include an assessment of whether a deeper business case 
analysis is needed. It is now time for the second, more detailed iteration of the LCU USV 
SE and OSA process. The second iteration may be very short, and may simply be a 
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leadership decision to proceed to detailed design or analysis of a certain needed 
capability. It may include the decision to perform an in-depth Capabilities Based 
Assessment, Mission Needs Analysis, sensitivity analysis, measure of effectiveness 
analysis, or Cost Benefit Analysis to assess the most suitable mission areas, or vessel 
designs. This pilot study is sufficient to initiate an in-depth business case analysis by an 
forum such as the Defense Acquisition Research Symposium (DARS). 
The LCU USV can be used for a plethora of missions if redesigned for flexibility. 
Although this thesis focuses mostly on the simple addition of unmanned navigation and 
maneuvering capability, a few simple architectural modifications can greatly increase the 
utility of this craft. The required mission of the LCU USV is likely to be dynamic and 
changing according to mission needs at any given point in time in the future. A detailed 
study of this includes a detailed analysis of alternatives, and conduct of a more granular 
level of concepts of operations. This work can be an exemplar for other conversions of 
manned craft into USVs.  That knowledge alone may be sufficient justification to proceed 
since it is an enabler for rapid force reconstitution.   
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APPENDIX A. DISPLACEMENT LANDING CRAFT 
See chapter I, Section C for the characteristics of the U.S. Navy LCU 1610. 
 
This Appendix is from (Bottelson 2001). It presents a selection of displacement 
landing craft for comparison to the LCU 1610 Class vessels.  
 
Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel (LCVP) aka: “Higgins Boat” 
This craft was designed specifically to meet the needs of the amphibious fleet during 





Figure 36.  Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel (from Bottelson 2001). 
Landing Craft, Tank (LCT) - Mark 5 Type 
 
The Mark 5 Type Landing Craft was eventually developed into the LCU. The LCT Mark 
6 version was developed in mid-1944 and made use of lessons learned from D-Day. It 
was built with a stern gate that allowed for “drive-through” of vehicles. The LCT Mark 6 
very much resembles the modern LCU (Bottelson 2001). 
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Figure 37.  Landing Craft, Tank (from Bottelson 2001). 







Landing Craft, Mechanized (LCM) Mark 8 (LCM-8) 
This Craft is currently in use for training and MPF support (Bottelson 2001) 
 
 




Patrol Boat, River – Mark I (PBR-I) 
 












Assault Support Patrol Boat (ASPB) 
 
 





Figure 39.  Landing and Combat Craft (from Bottelson 2001). 
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APPENDIX B. TECHNOLOGY READINESS LEVELS 
Conceptual systems for each of the mission capabilities identified are assessed from a 




Figure 40.  Technology Readiness Levels (from DOD 2007). 
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APPENDIX C. LCU-USV 4-LEVEL FUNCTIONAL 
DECOMPOSITION 
This thesis presents an overarching functional analysis that covers the scope of the 
potential mission set. This functional decomposition is partially adapted from the 
Required Operational Capabilities And Projected Operational Environment For Navy 
Expeditionary Intelligence Command Forces (OPNAV N85 2010) and from NPS-SE-11–
006 Capstone Project/Thesis (Calvert 2011). Note that functions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 may 
also be represented as subordinate functions to each of functions “4.X.” However, it is 
presented in this manner to facilitate comprehension. 
 
1. Load/Recover/Retrieve/Receive Payload 
1.1. Load/Receive/Recover/Retrieve USV/UUV/UAV for MIW, ISR, or support 
missions while underway 
 
2. Transit/Operate/Maintain LCU USV Platform 
2.1. Employ safety countermeasures 
2.1.1. Control LCU USV during all conditions of active jamming 
2.1.2. Prevent and control damage 
2.1.3. Control fire, flooding, electrical, structural, propulsion, and hull casualties 
2.1.4. Carry out emergency destruction of classified matter and equipment 
rapidly and efficiently.  
2.1.5. Provide ability for personnel to abandon/scuttle ship rapidly.  
2.1.6. Provide Self-destruct capability for LCU USV  
2.1.7. Maintain security against unfriendly acts 
2.1.8. Provide damage control security and surveillance 
 
2.2. Perform seamanship, airmanship and navigation tasks 
2.2.1. Operate day and night, and under all weather conditions 
2.2.2. Navigate under all conditions of geographic location, weather, and 
visibility 
2.2.2.1. Transit autonomously via GPS waypoints to area of responsibility  
2.2.2.2. Transit or semi-autonomously via remote commands from shore, 
commands from an on-board pilot, and/or GPS waypoints. 
2.2.2.3. Conduct manned transit with traditional LCU craftmaster 
2.2.3. Operate from a well-deck equipped amphibious ship 
2.2.4. Operate from a pier 
2.2.5. Get underway, moor, anchor, and sortie with duty section in a safe manner 
2.2.6. Utilize programmed evasive steering  
2.2.7. Employ evasion techniques 
2.2.8. Tow or be towed 




3. Unload/Deploy/Launch Payload including MIW, ISR, and Functional mission 
equipment. 
3.1. Deploy/Launch/Load USV/UUV/UAV for MIW, ISR, or support missions while 
underway, or while anchored. 
 
 
4. Execute Missions 
4.1. Execute environmental collection in permissive environments 
4.1.1. Host/maintain environmental collection payload(s) and supporting 
equipment on LCU USV platform to execute environmental collection in 
permissive environments 
4.1.2. Provide all necessary systems, services, programs, and facilities to 
safeguard classified payload systems, material, and information.  
4.1.3. Provide all necessary systems, services, programs, and facilities to 
remotely monitor the embarked payload.  
4.1.4. Activate/deploy/launch/unload payload(s) and mission equipment for 
while underway, or while anchored. 
4.1.4.1. Tow sensor packages 
4.1.5. Deactivate/load/recover/retrieve/receive payload(s) while underway, or 
while anchored. 
4.1.6. Replenish the payload 
4.1.6.1. Secure payload 
4.1.6.2. Establish connection with payload 
4.1.6.3. Repower payload 
4.1.6.4. Transfer/receive, process, and analyze data from payload 
 
4.2. Execute Persistent ISR in permissive environments 
4.2.1. Host/maintain persistent ISR payload(s) and supporting equipment on 
LCU USV platform to collect, process, and evaluate information to 
determine location, identity, and capability of hostile forces through ISR 
means.  
 
[All other Persistent ISR mission functional activities are the same as activities 4.1.2 
through 4.1.5] 
 
4.3. Execute Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination 
4.3.1. Host/maintain communications payload(s) and supporting equipment on 
LCU USV platform for coordination and control of external organizations or 
forces and control of unit’s facilities 
4.3.2. Host/maintain communications payload(s) and supporting equipment on 
LCU USV platform to relay visual and electronic Naval communications 
4.3.3. Host/maintain payload(s) and supporting equipment on LCU USV 
platform to effectively use the electromagnetic spectrum for detection and 
targeting while deterring, exploiting, reducing or denying its use by the 
enemy. 
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4.3.4. Host/maintain communications payload(s) and supporting equipment on 
LCU USV platform to act as an information processing and intermediary 
decision point for command and control of downstream mission needs.  
 
[All other Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination mission functional activities 
are the same as activities 4.1.2 through 4.1.5] 
 
4.4. Execute Payload Delivery, Autonomous ship-to-shore, or shore-to-shore 
connector payload Delivery 
4.4.1. Transfer/receive cargo and personnel from ship to shore 
4.4.2. Host/maintain payload(s) and supporting equipment on LCU USV 
platform for resupply of combat consumables to combat forces in the theater 
of operation, noncombat general payload transfer/receive operations ,and 
other supply support missions 
4.4.3. Provide support facilities for material and passenger handling and securing 
  
[All other Payload Delivery mission functional activities are the same as activities 
4.1.2 through 4.1.5] 
 
 
4.5. Execute Unmanned Vehicle Support 
4.5.1. Host/maintain environmental collection payload(s) and supporting 
equipment on LCU USV platform to execute unmanned vehicle support in 
permissive environments 
 
[All other Unmanned Vehicle Support mission functional activities are the same as 
activities 4.1.2 through 4.1.5] 
 
4.6. Execute Search and rescue (SAR) of conscious victims 
4.6.1. Function as on-scene commander or relay station for Search and Rescue 
(SAR) operation 
4.6.2. Host/maintain payload(s) and supporting equipment on LCU USV 
platform to execute SAR 
 
[All other SAR mission functional activities are the same as activities 4.1.2 through 
4.1.5] 
 
4.7. Execute Training Support 
4.7.1. Host/maintain payload(s) and supporting equipment on LCU USV 
platform to execute VBSS, antipiracy, targeting, electronic countermeasures 
training and other training support. 
 
[All other Training Support mission functional activities are the same as activities 
4.1.2 through 4.1.5] 
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4.8. Execute Test platform missions 
4.8.1. Host/maintain Test Mission payload(s) and supporting equipment on LCU 
USV platform to execute unmanned vehicle support in permissive 
environments. 
4.8.2. Receive direct commands from a shore facility during the test. 
 
[All other Test mission functional activities are the same as activities 4.1.2 through 
4.1.5] 
 
4.9. Execute MCM intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) 
4.9.1. Host/maintain MCM IPB payload(s) and supporting equipment on LCU 
USV platform to execute unmanned vehicle support in permissive 
environments. 
 
[All other MCM IPB mission functional activities are the same as activities 4.1.2 
through 4.1.5] 
 
4.10. Minefield proofing 
4.10.1. Host/maintain Minefield proofing payload(s) and supporting equipment on 
LCU USV platform to execute unmanned vehicle support in permissive 
environments. 
 
[All other MCM IPB mission functional activities are the same as activities 4.1.2 
through 4.1.5] 
 
5. Host/Maintain Payload on Platform 
5.1. Receive fuel while underway or docked 
5.2. Provide all necessary systems, services, programs, and facilities to safeguard 
classified material and information.  
 
 
6. Maintain LCU USV Platform 
6.1. Provide upkeep and maintenance of LCU USV 
6.2. Provide organizational level maintenance 
6.3. Repair own unit’s equipment 
6.4. Receive fuel while underway or docked 
6.5. Provide all necessary systems, services, programs, and facilities to remotely 
monitor the LCU USV system condition.  
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APPENDIX D. EXEMPLAR COMPANIES, PARTS AND COSTS 
There are several technologies that exist to help alter the navigation, steering, and 
control systems of the LCU to repurpose it as a USV. This appendix shows a number of 
common candidate exemplar systems.  Lessons learned by other OSA programs can 
likewise provide even better possibilities.   
B. NAVIGATION SYSTEM  
There are several technologies that are key to converting the LCU into a USV. 
One of the primary systems that needs conversion is the navigation system. Technologies 
that may be altered or installed to convert the navigation system are as follows: 
1. Radar 
The LCU is likely able to keep the existing Furuno radar, but add a Simrad 4G 
Frequency Modulated Continuous Wave (FMCW) radar for close up detection. The 
initial signal transmission of the Furuno most likely does not allow for close object 
detection and avoidance. However, the FMCW Simrad 4G might complement the Furuno 
by detecting objects that are relatively close to the LCU USV.  
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Figure 41.  4G Frequency Modulated Continuous Wave (FMCW) radar (from Simrad 
Yachting 2014). 
2. Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR) 
LiDAR is a technology that aids the USV in close-up object detection and 
avoidance. The word is short for Light Detection and Ranging. “This 360-degree rotating 
device incorporates 64 laser beams to produce colorful 3–D data images on a computer 
screen and is being used by leading map content providers for creating the maps now 
seen on mobile devices and GPS systems. While the LiDAR sensors are used in 
unmanned cars, mining trucks and military patrol boats, Hall believes LiDAR [is] helpful 
for docking to show obstacles in day” (DeMartini 2013). 
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Figure 42.  Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR) system (from DeMartini 2013). 
3. Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) 
The existing LCU global positioning satellite (GPS) system has both commercial 
GPS and Military GPS components. The LCU USV GPS system keeps the two GPS 
signals, but changes the commercial GPS to one that talks NMEA 2000, a plug-and-play 
communications standard used for connecting marine sensors and display units within 
ships and boats, vice NMEA 0183, the combined electrical and data specification for 
communication between marine electronics. Alternatively, the design can utilize a 
converter for both commercial and DAGR GPS’s that can convert the serial NMEA 0183 
to NMEA 2000 Controller Area Network (CAN) bus that makes it easier to 
transmit/receive from the craft level systems. The same is true for the Gyrocompass. 
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4. Speed and Depth Sensors 
The LCU USV can utilize a Maretron Depth/Speed/Temperature (DST) 110 
triducer, transmitter so that the true speed/depth through water can be recorded and 
analyzed.  
5. Inertial Navigation 
In addition to altering the traditional navigation systems, the LCU USV design 
likely needs to add an inertial Navigation System. In case of failure of gyrocompass 
and/or GPS, the vessel can maintain position and heading accuracy for a period of time. 
6. Cameras  
The existing LCU do not have situational awareness or sensory cameras. This is 
an added system for conversion to the LCU USV. The design requires 360-degree view 
cameras as well as stereo optics for gauging craft heading. The FLIR company makes a 
camera that is essentially just a software upgrade to their control system for 360 view. 
There are several others cameras in the marketplace from L-3, General Dynamics, and 
other companies that were tested and utilized on other Navy USV programs at 
NSWCCD.  
 
Figure 43.  FLIR Systems 360 degree camera (from OpticsPlanet 2014). 
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C. STEERING SYSTEM 
The existing LCU fleet recently received installs of an upgraded central 
machinery monitoring and control system (CMMCS). The CMMCS can last for many 
years to come, and works well as a basis for the LCU USV steering system.  
The feedback sensor for the rudder positions likely needs to be changed to a 
Linear Voltage Differential Transmitter. Doing this reduces the system’s susceptible to 
noise, and vibration that has plagued the ones currently in use.  
The IQANTM electronic control system for mobile machinery that was used for 
the new CMMCS system is the exact same system as that used for the Navy’s USV 
programs for the LCS UISS Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS) steering control 
module. There are several other USV’s that are being tested such as the Autonomous 
Maritime Navigation (AMN) boat. An added benefit of using the existing IQAN system 
is that it is already J1939 compliant and can be modified relatively cheaply to suit the 
needs of the “master control system” i.e., the brain. This is in line with open systems 
architecture principles.  
There are several companies, including WR Systems company and Spatial 
Integrated Systems (SIS), that both have fantastic experience in developing steering 
control systems for the USVs. After conversion and alteration for use with the LCU USV, 
the system may no longer be considered COTS as such alterations are customized for the 
platform in use. However, the software for the CMMCS can be easily modified to meet 
the messaging standards for all USVs. For example, the standard might say that PGN 
65280 is for steering and the first two bytes are for main rudder and the second two bytes 
are for the flanking rudder position.  
Because the LCU USV design builds off of existing, newly installed systems, the 
cost is minimal to get the “steering system” in line to be USV capable. This also helps 
meet objectives for cost, schedule, and government data ownership, and intellectual 
property ownership. This also helps ensure that the messages are controlled and defined 
so any third party control system can integrate easily with it. If the LCU USV steering 
system design went with a pure COTS system, there is a high likelihood that the 
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messages are proprietary and likely requires a memorandum of agreement (MOA) or 
other contractual agreement with the steering company to release them to the 
government, if in fact they are known.  
D. CONTROL SYSTEM  
The LCU USV control system is split into a “Craft Level” and overall “System 
Level” components. The Craft Level consists of the controls, monitoring, and automation 
of the systems required to run the boat manned or unmanned. This consists of the 
engines, generators, power distribution/control, steering, throttle control, ancillary 
machinery monitoring and control, and navigation.  
The “System Level” consists of the “brain” of the LCU USV control system. This 
consists of the cameras, network communications (such as PRC-117G 
VHF/UHF/SATCOM), ground control station, and other systems. 
1. Craft Level 
Because the LCU vessels have a new CMMCS, the craft level controls do not 
need extensive alteration. Ideally, the engines are upgraded to an engine controller unit 
(ECU) controlled engine such as MTU, Caterpillar, and even new Detroit Diesels. This 
gives the added benefit of emission controls as well as simplified fly-by-wire control. 
However, it may not be necessary if it is cost prohibitive.  
New generators also need to be acquired that are ECU controlled as well as 
automated switchgear with smart relays/breakers. The existing LCU have two generators 
on board so redundancy is covered as one can supply the required loads. Essentially, the 
new CMMCS created a generic ECU that really monitored the engine, but might not 
control emissions. With an ECU controlled engine, the fly-by-wire is not necessary.  
The switchgear needs to be monitored by a programmable logic controller (PLC). 
The IQAN system can perform this function, but it is limited in its inputs and some 
converters to convert IP to CAN/J1939 or Profibus/Modbus to J1939 as most relays don’t 
talk J1939 since that is a mobile communication protocol. There is ability for 
improvement in these OSA standards. Many switchgears come with automatic paralleling 
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capabilities. This is not present on the existing LCU as it can only manually parallel with 
governor controls that can help keep them in parallel, control the reactive droop, load 
balancing, etc. 
The power distribution panels needs to be changed out to something that is 
automated. The Octoplex makes a suitable AC power distribution system that is NMEA 
2000 compliant and has automatic breakers that can be reset if tripped by sending a 
message via the CAN bus.  
The DC distribution also needs to be upgraded for the same reason. The E-T-A 
Company makes several modules that were used for Navy USV projects including the 
Sea Lion. The E-T-A modules are easy to program and the government can control that 





Figure 44.  The Honorable Dr. Donald C. Winter uses a remote device to bring the 
SEAL Insertion, Observation_and Neutralization (SEALION) craft into port 
at Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek (from Wikimedia Commons 2014). 
The ancillary machinery required such as pumps, bow ramp motor, etc., can all be 
monitored and controlled via the IQANTM electronic control system for mobile 
machinery. For safety and condition monitoring, Locked rotor conditions are detected 
from the Octoplex system and messages indicating conditions are sent to IQAN. 
The upgrades for this level of control system upgrades costs approximately 
$500K with the engines/generator upgrades. An additional $350K costs are accrued if the 
panel, switchgear, and other ancillary upgrades are installed. These costs account for the 
detailed design costs, and some non-recurring engineering (NRE). 
 153
2. System Level 
The System Level control system is the “brain” of the system. It is the master 
controller of the system. WR Systems and SIS are two companies that were responsible 
for helping develop the network link, selecting radios, designing the ground control 
station, cameras, on existing U.S. Navy USV programs. One example of the ground 
control station is called Mobile Operation and Control Unit (MOCU).  
Another important system is the radios that must be network radios for passing 
data over the air. The Sea Lancet is an example of these radios. There are other models 
by Cobham that are sufficient for high data rates. If it needed to be over-the-horizon 
capable, then the system needs to utilize satellite communications (SATCOM) from the 
PRC-117G radio system. The L-3 also makes data radios with paralleled antennas. These 
were tested by the Navy on the Stiletto USV with transmission of HD video from many 
miles away. The current LCU fleet has the PRC-117G upgrade. 
Both the WR company and SIS company have been involved with the cameras for 
U.S. Navy USVs. There are several 360 degree cameras out there that are marine capable. 
Gyrocam by General Dynamics is one example, FLIR is another. As stated above, FLIR’s 
is just a software upgrade so costs are minimal for the upgrade. L-3 also made a suitable 
high definition 360 degree camera. 
A rough order of magnitude estimate for developing a new systems level control 
for the LCU USV is on the order of $400–600K depending on the mission requirements 
of the LCU USV. If it is to operate over the horizon for long durations that requires 
redundancy and a larger quantity smart technology.  
E. COMPANIES FOR LCU USV SYSTEM DESIGN AND INSTALLATION  
For the master control system, ground control system, communications, etc. (i.e., 




Table 33.   Companies for LCU USV System Level Control design and 
installation. 




Table 34.   Companies for LCU USV System Level Control design and 
installation. 
F. NON-RECURRING ENGINEERING (NRE) COSTS 
The non-recurring engineering (NRE) costs for the LCU USV varies with the 
level of alterations that are required by the final design. Engines, Navigation, AC/DC 
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power distribution and control, Craft Level Controls, System Level Controls (including 
communications) might all require separate NRE efforts. 
1. Engine/Generator Upgrade 
This upgrade effort costs roughly $200K for just the generators and another 
$300K for the main engines. If all new, high technology engines and generators are 
purchased, they might cost $2M or more per vessel set. The NRE for a system of this 
nature, to include drawings, electrical/mechanical/naval architecture calculations, etc., is 
approximately $400K. 
2. Navigation 
There is a need for a study to determine the required equipment. A rough estimate 
for the NRE is approximately $200K for design and drawings. 
3. AC/DC Power Distribution and Control 
This effort includes the NRE for the switchgear. Since this power system needs to 
be automated, require integration into the craft level control system, automated parallel 
capability, and monitoring, the design NRE costs are approximately $150K. 
The distribution system for AC costs approximately $150K and the design of the 
DC distribution system is about the same.  
4. Craft Level Control Systems 
Keeping the existing CMMCS and adding automation capabilities to it is likely to 
minimizes the costs. With the engines being ECU controlled and fly-by-wire, the master 
controllers (MC2s) in the engine rooms can be repurposed to ancillary machinery 
monitoring and control and have one of their CAN busses talking to each 
engine/generator.  
It is an additional $200K to change the software, add modules, and re-design the 
CAN bus system to create a redundant bus from the master modules as well as add the 
ETA (DC Distribution), AC Distribution, monitoring, and control, etc. 
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5. System Level Control Systems 
Depending on the mission requirements, if it is necessary for over the horizon 
operations, and the level of required autonomy the system level control costs might vary. 
Designing for semi-autonomy and/or remote control autonomy with the human in the 
loop, the design of such a system leveraging previous designs costs approximately 
$500K. 
6. Summary 
In summary, the total for NRE is likely to be on the order of $1.85M. This may be 
rounded up to $2.50M for contingency, scope creep, etc.   
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APPENDIX E. ACTION PLANS FROM THE BII MMOWGLI 
The Business Innovation Initiative (Bii) Massive Multiplayer Online Wargame 
Leveraging the Internet (MMOWGLI) game explores how to achieve business goals of 
the Navy s Open Systems Architecture (OSA) Strategy. The motivating theme is 
exploring the contracting trade space for Intellectual Property (IP) and Data Rights. The 
game explores what IP and data rights are worth to systems stakeholders. Professional 
feedback is essential to exploration of all possible ideas in the game (Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) 2014). 
The game was based on the fact that large and small industry players each want to 
compete and profit effectively, now and in the future. Meanwhile, the Navy needs 
technical data rights for long-term system interoperability, maintainability, and 
competition. Together, the professional players of the Bii MMOWGLI game derived Idea 
Card Chains and Action Plans, working together to effectively solve problems associated 
with OSA (Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 2014). 
The following are excerpts from the Bii MMOWGLI Action Plans as derived by 
the players that participated in a recent Bii game conducted over the course of two weeks 
during July 2014. The first Action Plan is centered on the issue of platform rights. The 
second Action Plan is associated with payload rights. Table 35 shows Bii MWOWGLI 




Page Title Uniform Resource Locator (URL) 
Business Innovation Initiative Homepage https://mmowgli.nps.edu/bii 
Action Plan 43 
PLATFORM RIGHTS: What are best license 
and data rights for the Platform PM to add 
OSA capabilities to unmanned-system 
controllers for LCU-USV platform itself? 
https://mmowgli.nps.edu/bii#69_43 
Action Plan 44 
PAYLOAD RIGHTS: What are best license 
and data rights for OSA-capable payloads 
(UAVs, other systems) needing connectivity 
when deployed on LCU-USV platform? 
https://mmowgli.nps.edu/bii#69_44 
Idea cards exploring technical data policies 
for the following issue corresponding to 
Action Plans 43 and 44: “A long-term Navy 
utility platform (LCU) is near end-of-life 
milestone. Program is considering renewal by 

















































Figure 45.  Excerpt (Page 1 of 4) from Bii MMOWGLI Action Plan for Platform Rights 











































Figure 46.  Excerpt (Page 2 of 4) from Bii MMOWGLI Action Plan for Platform Rights 











































Figure 47.  Excerpt (Page 3 of 4) from Bii MMOWGLI Action Plan for Platform Rights 











































Figure 48.  Excerpt (Page 4 of 4) from Bii MMOWGLI Action Plan for Platform Rights 
(from Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 2014).  
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Figure 49.  Excerpt (Page 1 of 4) from Bii MMOWGLI Action Plan for Payload Rights 




Figure 50.  Excerpt (Page 2 of 4) from Bii MMOWGLI Action Plan for Payload Rights 















































Figure 51.  Excerpt (Page 3 of 4) from Bii MMOWGLI Action Plan for Payload Rights 
















Figure 52.  Excerpt (Page 4 of 4) from Bii MMOWGLI Action Plan for Payload Rights 
(from Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 2014). 
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